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COMMENT
PRUNING THE HEDGE: WHO IS A “CLIENT” AND
WHOM DOES AN ADVISER ADVISE?
Edward Pekarek ∗
I. INTRODUCTION
Phillip Goldstein, government gadfly and a former New York City
municipal employee, 1 is now manager of a group of pooled investments
that operates under the moniker “Bulldog Investors.” 2 Mr. Goldstein 3
took the Securities and Exchange Commission to task in a successful
challenge 4 of the so-called “Hedge-Fund Rule.” 5 The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit was apparently persuaded
∗

The Author holds a Corporate, Banking and Finance LLM degree from Fordham
University School of Law; J.D., Cleveland-Marshall College of Law; and a B.A., The
College of Wooster. The Author thanks Fordham University Adjunct Professors John
F.X. Peloso and Barry W. Rashkover for their kind guidance and sage observations.
The foregoing opinions, conclusions, and perhaps errors, are solely those of the Author,
who can be contacted at mail@edpekarek.com.
1. See Jay Loomis, Activist Investing on the Rise, THE J. NEWS, Feb. 18, 2007,
available at http://www.thejournalnews.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20070218/
BUSINESS01/702180320/1066 (last visited Mar. 26, 2007) (“[Phillip Goldstein]
previously worked 25 years as a civil engineer for New York City.”).
2. See generally http://www.bulldoginvestors.com/.
3. See, e.g., infra note 80.
4. See Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
5. The respondent SEC apparently took umbrage with the Goldstein petitioners’
use of this phrase because it created some confusion that the Rule itself governed hedge
funds, when in fact it acted as an oversight measure for investment advisers, rather than
the funds under management. See Goldstein v. SEC, 2005 WL 1636146, at *5 n.1
(D.C. Cir. 2005) [hereinafter SEC’s Appell. Brief] (“[P]etitioners’ pervasive references
to the ‘Hedge Fund Rule’ create a misleading impression.”). Despite these comments
by the SEC in brief, the Goldstein court adopted the phrase coined by the petitioners
and used it throughout its opinion, including in its ruling statement. Goldstein, 451
F.3d at 884, 877, 880-81, 883-84 (“The petition for review is granted, and the Hedge
Fund Rule is vacated and remanded.”) (emphasis added).
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by the “Bulldog’s” theory, and vacated the entire investment adviser
registration regime as “arbitrary.”6 The court of appeals largely based
this decision upon the contextual meaning of the word “client,” 7 and the
prior use and interpretation of that term by the SEC. 8
The “Bulldog’s” challenge of the investment adviser registration
framework may prove to be among a handful of events responsible for
the introduction of the phrase “hedge fund” into mainstream 9 America’s
lexicon and perhaps our collective culture. 10 The resolution of the
Goldstein matter now appears to be a temporary regulatory setback that
might later be viewed as an instance of regulatory “creative destruction”
that leads to meaningful regulatory reform. 11 Perhaps the “Bulldog”
chewing up the investment adviser registration regime also ushered in a
new era of how we perceive these pooled investments and their
respective roles in domestic capital markets, how they might be
monitored by market regulators in the U.S. and abroad, and the
substantive debate it fostered may later be recognized as the catalyst for
a pragmatic regulatory reform of the hedge fund landscape.
II. “BULLDOG” CHALLENGES SEC “CLIENT” COUNTING
During its review of the so-called “Hedge Fund Rule” (the
“Rule”) 12 in the matter of Goldstein v. SEC, 13 the U.S. Circuit Court of
6.
7.

Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 883.
Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 876 (citing 17 C.F.R. § 275.203(b)(3)-1 (“[T]he
Commission has interpreted this provision to refer to the partnership or entity itself as
the adviser’s ‘client.’”)).
8. See Part II, infra.
9. Even one of the most mainstream Internet sources, Wikipedia, now has a
lengthy entry for “hedge funds.” See, e.g., http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hedge_fund
(last visited Apr. 4, 2007).
10. The creator and executive producer of the HBO series “Entourage,” Doug
Ellin, is currently developing an untitled HBO comedy series based on the fictitious
lives of hedge fund managers. See Denise Martin, Boys’ night out at HBO, Ellin’s next
comedy series set on Wall Street, VARIETY, Oct. 10, 2006, available at
http://www.variety.com/article/VR1117951668.html?cs=1&s=h&p=0 (last visited April
24, 2007); see also Andrew Ross Sorkin, Wall Street TV, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK,
available at http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2006/10/18/wall-street-tv/ (last visited
April 24, 2007).
11. Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, pp. 82-85
(Harper, 1975) [orig. pub. 1942].
12. See SEC’s Appell. Brief, 2005 WL 1636146, at *5.
13. 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
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Appeals for the District of Columbia addressed some of the key issues in
the interpretive debate of the definition of the word “client” within the
context of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (the “Advisers Act”). 14
This Comment addresses some of those issues, including: (i) the current
state of the hedge fund market sector, (ii) background related to the
adoption of the Rule, (iii) the key challenges asserted by the Goldstein
petitioners, (iv) interpretation of the term “client” as it relates to the
“private fund adviser” exemption within the Advisers Act, and (v) the
factual bases cited by the Respondent Securities and Exchange
Commission (the “SEC” or the “Commission”) in support of the
Commission’s promulgation of the Rule, and the resultant challenges
raised by the Goldstein petitioners to those seemingly sound bases. The
“Bulldog” prevailed in his challenge of the Rule due in no small part to
the SEC’s inconsistent interpretations of the term “client” over the years
in various contexts.
A. Is the Hedge Fund Sector an Overgrown Landscape?
The term “hedge fund” has defied precise definition, and what
started as a rather simple concept of pooling investment funds and
utilizing strategies to insulate the pooled capital from significant market
risk has evolved greatly in a half century. Sociologist turned–journalist–
turned fund manager Alfred Winslow Jones 15 coined the phrase “hedge
fund” in 1949, 16 less than a generation after the epic crash of the U.S.
14. The Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1 [hereinafter Advisers
Act].
15. David A. Vaughan, Partner, Dechert LLP, Comments for the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission Roundtable on Hedge Funds, May 14-15, 2003, Selected
Definitions of “Hedge Fund” (citing Roger Lowenstein, When Genius Failed (2000));
Scott J. Lederman, Hedge Funds, FIN. PRODUCT FUNDAMENTALS: A GUIDE FOR
LAWYERS 11-3, 11-4, 11-5 (Clifford E. Kirsch Ed., 2000); Carol Loomis, The Jones
FORTUNE
(Apr.
1966),
available
at
Nobody
Keeps
Up
With,
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/hedgefunds/hedge-vaughn.htm (last visited Feb. 25,
2007); see also Ted Gogoll, What’s Driving the Hedge Fund Boom?,
BUSINESSWEEK.COM, Oct. 13, 2006, available at http://www.businessweek.com/
investor/content/oct2006/pi20061013_353103.htm (last visited Dec. 2, 2006); see
Goldstein v. SEC, No. 1:04CV02216, 2004 WL 3633837 (D.C. Cir. 2004) [hereinafter
Goldstein Complaint].
16. Stephen J. Brown, Keynote Address at the PACAP/FMA Meeting, Melbourne,
Australia, July 7, 2000, Hedge Funds: Omniscient or Just Plain Wrong, NYU Stern
School of Business (Mar. 9, 2001), available at http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~sbrown/
omniscient.pdf (last visited Dec. 1, 2006).
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stock market—the financial event widely considered to be the economic
“tipping point” that ushered in the “Great Depression.” 17 Jones’s term
originally contemplated pooled investment portfolios 18 composed of a
combination of long and short equity positions, 19 where the short sells
presumably counter-balance long positions allowing for capital growth
opportunities while insuring, or “hedging,” against any significant risk
of loss, irrespective of the market’s direction. 20
Today, Mr. Jones’s coined phrase better describes the legal
management structures 21 of investment pools 22 rather than the
17. Stanley K. Schultz, Professor of History, American History 102: Civil War to
the Present, Lecture 18 at the Univ. of Wis. (1999), available at
http://us.history.wisc.edu/hist102/lectures/lecture18.html (last visited Nov. 29, 2006).
In the fall of 1929, Yale University economist Irving Fisher confidently declared: “The
nation is marching along a permanently high plateau of prosperity.” Federal Reserve
Bank of Dallas, Irving Fisher: Origins of Modern Central Bank Policy, ECON.
INSIGHTS, Vol. 10, No. 1 (Dec. 6, 2006), available at http://www.dallasfed.org/
research/ei/ei0501.html (last visited Dec. 2, 2006). Five days later (Oct. 29, 1929), on
“Black Tuesday,” the U.S. stock market’s bottom dropped out and ushered in the Great
Depression—the worst economic downturn in American history. Id. Mr. Fisher
suffered huge losses in his personal portfolio (as well as in his reputation as an
economist) after the 1929 crash and Great Depression, “eventually leaving an estate so
small it wasn’t even taxed.” Id.
18. During the mid-twentieth-century, pooled investment funds largely functioned
at the fringes of the market. Vaughan, supra note 15.
19. Id; see Brown, supra note 16.
20. See Brown, supra note 16; Goldstein Complaint, supra note 15, at ¶ 17.
21. Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 876 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a10, 80a-13); The Goldstein court recognized that:
Another distinctive feature of hedge funds is their management structure. Unlike
mutual funds, which must comply with detailed requirements for independent boards
of directors, and whose shareholders must explicitly approve of certain actions,
domestic hedge funds are usually structured as limited partnerships to achieve
maximum separation of ownership and management. In the typical arrangement, the
general partner manages the fund (or several funds) for a fixed fee and a percentage of
the gross profits from the fund. The limited partners are passive investors and
generally take no part in management activities.

Id. at 876 (internal citations omitted).
22. David Pilla, With Amaranth’s Implosion, Experts Eye Insurers’ Exposure to
Hedge Fund Risks, BEST’S INV. NEWS (via Comtex News), Oct. 2, 2006. Hedge fund
structure has been a “tricky aspect” according to at least one legal pundit:
One tricky aspect of hedge funds is that they generally are structured as limited
partnerships, said [Nixon Peabody LLP investment partnership litigation specialist
Tim] Mungovan. An investor in a hedge fund is a limited partner – a very different
arrangement from the shareholder in a mutual fund or stock. “There are 75 years
worth of accumulated corporate law on the duties that a company’s directors and
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investment strategies employed. Today’s hedge funds typically issue
unregistered securities in “private offerings,” which, in general, are
privately held by a restricted number of “accredited” investors, 23 and
which experienced record capital inflows of roughly $126.5 billon in
2006. 24 These pooled funds are typically either single or multiple
strategy vehicles 25 that employ an array of investment approaches

officers owe to their shareholders,” he said. “There is not anywhere near the history
of laws and court cases involving limited partnerships.” That means there is greater
uncertainty about the rights, duties and obligations surrounding the limited
partnership, he said.
...
So why are most hedge funds structured as limited partnerships? “My personal
opinion is that many of them have adopted the limited-partnership structure in part to
avoid regulation by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission,” said
Mungovan . . . . The limited-partnership structure of hedge funds, along with their
penchant for secrecy in terms of trading positions, means they shy away from such
terms as “investment adviser,” said Mattessich. Investment advisers generally are
taken to be under the regulatory jurisdiction of the SEC.

Id.
23. Securities and Exchange Commission Staff Hedge Fund Report Fact Sheet,
Implications of the Growth of Hedge Funds, REPORT OF THE STAFF OF THE U.S.
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMISSION [sic], at 9-10, 61 (Sept. 2003) [hereinafter 2003
SEC Staff Report], available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/hedgefunds0903.pdf
(last visited Dec. 1, 2006). The term “accredited investor” was defined in 2006 to
include:
Individuals who have a net worth, or joint worth with their spouse, above $1,000,000,
or have income above $200,000 in the last two years (or joint income with their
spouse above $300,000) and a reasonable expectation of reaching the same income
level in the year of investment; or are directors, officers or general partners of the
hedge fund or its general partner; and
Certain institutional investors, including: banks; savings and loan associations;
registered brokers, dealers and investment companies; licensed small business
investment companies; corporations, partnerships, limited liability companies and
business trusts with more than $5,000,000 in assets; and many, if not most, employee
benefit plans and trusts with more than $5,000,000 in assets.

Id. at 15 (citing Rule 501(a) of Regulation D under The Securities Act of 1933).
24. See Aaron Seigel, Hedge Funds Rake in $126.5 billion, INV. NEWS, Jan. 17,
2007, available at http://www.investmentnews.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20070
119/REG/70119027/0/FRONTPAGE (last visited Jan. 20, 2007) (“Hedge fund inflows
for the quarter ended Dec. 31[, 2006] were $15.8 billion in a year that brought in a
record $126.5 billion of hedge fund inflows, according to data released by Hedge Fund
Research Inc. in Chicago.”); SEC, Hedging Your Bets: A Heads Up on Hedge Funds
and Funds of Hedge Funds, available at http://www.sec.gov/answers/hedge.htm (last
visited Nov 30, 2006).
25. See, e.g., Rolling In It, Why Investors Should Kick Up a Fuss About HedgeECONOMIST,
Nov.
16,
2006,
available
at
Fund
Fees,
THE
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ostensibly designed to generate above-market returns, including the
hedge fund adviser’s quest for the premium compensation known in the
industry as “alpha.” 26
The investment strategies utilized by hedge funds today are as
diverse as the assets classes they hold. Roughly nine-thousand hedge
funds 27 are currently in operation and control approximately two trillion
dollars, 28 reportedly five-percent of America’s total net worth. 29 The
http://www.economist.com/finance/displaystory.cfm?story_id=8173853
Feb. 18, 2007). The strategies vary among hedge-funds, but:

(last

visited

Hedge-fund managers are well aware of the limits of specializing [sic] in
niche products. Some simply close to new investors after reaching their
target for funds under management. But others want to keep growing. A
number develop private-equity or banking characteristics, by providing
capital directly to companies or making loans. Some are diversifying into
multi-strategy funds, which invest across a range of sectors. Others have
started long-only funds, thereby opening up a much bigger market. As Peter
Harrison of MPC investors, a fund manager, says: “There’s $1 trillion or so
in hedge funds but $90 trillion of long-only money and that’s the big prize.”
Id.
26. See Hedgeworld.com Glossary, available at http://www.hedgeworld.com
/bottom_links/index.cgi?page=glossary (last visited Mar. 26, 2007) (“Alpha: A
numerical value indicating a manager’s risk-adjusted excess rate of return relative to a
benchmark. Measures a manager’s ‘value-added’ in selecting individual securities,
independent of the effect of overall market movements.”); Raghuram G. Rajan, Benign
Financial Conditions, Asset Management, and Political Risks: Trying to Make Sense of
our Times, Oct 5-6, 2006, Speech at Conference on International Financial Instability:
Cross-Border Banking and National Regulation Organized by the Federal Reserve Bank
of Chicago, available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches /2006/100506.htm
(last visited Mar. 26, 2007). But see Steve Johnson, Replication is the New Buzzword,
FIN. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 20138222 (last visited Dec. 1,
2006); see also, Jeff Benjamin, Hedge funds embracing social mandate, INVESTMENT
NEWS, June 25, 2007, available at http://www.investmentnews.com/apps/pbcs.dll
/article?AID=/20070625 (last visited June 26, 2007). Mr. Goldstein noting that the
creation of “alpha” is a hedge fund’s raison d’etre, and adding a hint of what seems to
suggest some sort of Machiavellian investing philosphy:
“The function of a hedge fund is to create alpha, and anything that gets in the
way of that is unwanted,” said Phillip Goldstein, a manager of Opportunity
Partners LP, a hedge fund based in Pleasantville, N.Y. “It sounds like a
marketing gimmick, and I don’t know that any individuals would invest in
something like that.”
Id. (emphasis added).
27. See Rolling In It, supra note 25.
28. See Gogoll, supra note 15; see also Angela Ubide, Demystifying Hedge Funds,
FINANCE & DEVELOPMENT (IMF Q. MAGAZINE), Vol. 43, No. 2, June 2006, available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2006/06/basics.htm (last visited Mar. 26,
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breadth of alternative asset classes held and strategy types employed by
investment advisers are incredibly diverse. 30 Hedge funds have also
2007). The International Monetary Fund (the “IMF”) reported:
Currently, there are about 8,500 hedge funds operating worldwide, managing over $1
trillion in assets. Quite a leap from the 2,800 hedge funds, managing $2.8 billion in
assets in 1995, not to mention the amounts involved in the earliest hedge fund–type
investments in the days of Aristotle.

Id.
29. Power and Money – Rally for Regulation, Interview by Maria Bartiromo with
Attorney Paul Roth, Columbia Law Prof. Jack Coffee, and CNBC correspondent
Charlie Gasparino (CNBC television Broadcast Dec. 5, 2006).
30. See, e.g., Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 875-76 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (citing The
Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-12(a)(1),(3), 80a-13(a)(2), 2003
SEC Staff Report, supra note 23, at 33-43). The restrictions on investment classes and
transaction types that apply to “Investment Companies” (i.e., mutual funds) do not
apply to unregulated hedge funds:
The Investment Company Act places significant restrictions on the types of
transactions registered investment companies may undertake. Such companies are,
for example, foreclosed from trading on margin or engaging in short sales and must
secure shareholder approval to take on significant debt or invest in certain types of
assets, such as real estate or commodities. These transactions are all core elements of
most hedge funds’ trading strategies.

Id. (internal citations omitted); see Goldstein, 453 F.3d at 876 (citing 2003 SEC Staff
Report, supra note 23):
“Hedging” transactions, from which the term “hedge fund” developed, involve taking
both long and short positions on debt and equity securities to reduce risk. This is still
the most frequently used hedge fund strategy, though there are many others. Hedge
funds trade in all sorts of assets, from traditional stocks, bonds, and currencies to more
exotic financial derivatives and even non-financial assets. Hedge funds often use
leverage to increase their returns.
Another distinctive feature of hedge funds is their management structure. Unlike
mutual funds, which must comply with detailed requirements for independent boards
of directors, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10, and whose shareholders must explicitly approve of
certain actions, Id. § 80a-13, domestic hedge funds are usually structured as limited
partnerships to achieve maximum separation of ownership and management. In the
typical arrangement, the general partner manages the fund (or several funds) for a
fixed fee and a percentage of the gross profits from the fund. The limited partners are
passive investors and generally take no part in management activities.

Id. (internal citations omitted); see also Emil W. Henry, Jr., Assistant Secretary for
Financial Institutions, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Remarks Before the Exchequer Club,
May 17, 2006, JS-4270, available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/js4270.htm
(last visited Dec. 1, 2006). Investment advisers have almost unlimited investment
options available:
For example, many like me believe hedge funds are not properly classified when
labeled an “asset class.” Hedge funds are not an asset class. There is just too much
dispersion of strategy, leverage, and exposure to codify the group as such.
A hedge fund, by contrast, has virtually unlimited flexibility. All strategies are on the
table—long positions, short selling, leveraged holdings, equities, bonds, currencies,

920

FORDHAM JOURNAL OF
CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

Vol. XII

grown recently at an almost viral-like rate, 31 both in the number of
active funds, 32 and in terms of the staggering amount of assets currently
under management. Hedge fund securities trading dominates the daily
volume of many of the world’s markets, 33 and a significant portion of
recent SEC enforcement attention has been dedicated to alleged trading
abuses by these funds. 34 In many respects, however, the domestic
mutual fund industry still dwarfs the hedge fund sector and demands
much of the SEC’s already overextended attention; yet some market

derivatives, multiple industries, et cetera. All of these approaches are available and
widely utilized by the hedge fund community. Because capital tends to gravitate to
where it is least encumbered and restricted, and hence earns the highest risk-adjusted
return, it is not surprising that capital migrated from traditional funds to hedge funds.
Of course, like most things in life, one thing’s greatest strength can be its greatest
weakness. The great flexibility of the hedge fund structure also lends itself to conduct
that can lead to trouble, the most common being outsized risk-taking, concentrated
positions, and over-leveraging.

Id.; see Ubide, supra note 28.
Hedge funds may have an aura of exoticism and modernism, but their goals are as old
as the art of investing itself. They seek a positive annual return (the higher the better),
limited swings in value, and, above all else, capital preservation. They do so by using
the best of what modern financial science can provide—rapid price discovery;
massive mathematical and statistical processing; risk measurement and control
techniques; and leverage and active trading in corporate equities, bonds, foreign
exchange, futures, options, swaps, forwards, and other derivatives.

Id.; see CNBC report, Power and Money, CNBC Correspondent Melissa Lee reported
from the Alternative Asset Management Conference, Dana Point, Calif., Dec. 5, 2006.
Hedge funds are now reportedly taking direct positions in such diverse alternative assets
as infrastructure projects (e.g., bridges, toll roads, and oil-gas delivery pipelines, timber
properties, and Napa Valley vineyards). Id.
31. See Gogoll, supra note 15 (Hedge funds are expected to balloon to 11,700 with
$1.7 trillion in assets by 2008, according to Van Hedge Fund Advisors).
32. Id.; see also Ubide, supra note 28.
33. Heather Timmons, A London Hedge Fund That Opts for Engineers, Not
M.B.A.’s, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com
/2006/08/18/business/worldbusiness/18man.html? ex=1313553600&en=b2 fee1b41c85
af15&ei=5088 (last visited Mar. 26, 2007) (stating that hedge funds account for an
“estimated half of all United States stock trades and a quarter of worldwide currency
trades”).
34. Jesse Westbrook & Otis Bilodeau, U.S. Insider Trading Bill Takes Aim at
Hedge Funds, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Nov. 23, 2006, available at
www.iht.com/articles/2006/11/23/business/hedge.php (last visited Apr. 13, 2007)
(“Lawsuits involving hedge funds made up 11 percent of the SEC’s insider trading
cases in fiscal 2006, according to agency figures. The SEC expects to file more cases
against the industry alleging illegal trading in 2007, the commission’s enforcement
director, Linda Thomsen, said at a securities conference last week.”).
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commentators remain concerned that another market meltdown is
imminent and see hedge funds as its likely catalyst. 35

35. Ambrose Evan-Pritchard, Economic Storm Brewing In America, LONDON
TELEGRAPH, Dec. 7, 2006, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/opinion/
main.jhtml?xml=/opinion/2006/12/07/do0702.xml&sS (last visited Feb. 18, 2007).
U.S. Treasury Secretary (and former Goldman-Sachs chief), Henry “Hank” Paulson
publicly expressed some concern about the degree of economic influence that hedge
funds represent, and their potential for systemic damage:
The world economy is what matters, and I don’t like the smell of it. Nor, apparently,
does Hank Paulson, who made $700 million at Goldman Sachs before taking over the
U.S. Treasury this year. He has reactivated a crisis team with a command centre [sic]
in Washington to cope with the “systemic risk” in a market melt-down. His worry?
8,000 unregulated hedge funds with $1.3 trillion at hand, and derivative contracts now
worth $370 trillion. “We need to be very careful here,” he said. A well-sourced
article in Washington’s Weekly Standard says Mr. Paulson fears a “serious crisis that
would be a body-blow to the US economy.”

Id; see SEC Commissioner Paul S. Atkins, Remarks Before the N.Y. City Bar Assoc.
(May 5, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2006/spch050506psa.htm
(last visited Dec. 2, 2006) [hereinafter Speech]. Commissioner Atkins has noted the
“opportunity costs” the SEC encounters with hedge fund regulation:
One of the issues that Commissioner Glassman and I raised when we dissented from
the hedge fund rule was the opportunity cost to the Commission, which will result
from diverting resources from overseeing mutual funds to overseeing hedge fund
advisors. After all, there are more than 90 million mutual fund investors, compared to
an estimated 100,000 to 200,000 hedge fund investors . . . .

Id. (emphasis added); see Government Accountability Office, Report to Congressional
Requesters, Mutual Fund Industry: SEC’s Revised Examination Approach Offers
Potential Benefits, but Significant Oversight Challenges Remain, Report No. 05-415,
Aug. 2005, available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05415.pdf, at 35 (citing hedge
fund oversight challenges in the SEC’s mutual fund examination program and
questioned the “SEC’s capacity to effectively monitor the hedge fund industry given the
tradeoffs that the agency has had to make in overseeing the mutual fund industry.”);
Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 875 (stating that hedge funds “have historically been understood
not to present the same dangers to public markets as more widely available investment
companies, like mutual funds”); CNBC report, Nov. 29, 2006 (stating that mutual fund
assets rose to $10.01 trillion in October 2006, and hedge fund assets rose to $2 trillion
in the same month, according to Investment Company Institute (“ICI”) and HFM Week
data (respectively)); Melanie Waddell, Will the SEC Appeal? Dealing with hedge fund
registration’s legal challenge, INVESTMENTADVISOR, Aug. 2006, available at
http://www.investmentadvisor.com/article.php?topic=Alternative+Investments&article
=6648 (last visited Dec. 5, 2006) (“During a conversation with Lori Richards, director
of the SEC’s Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations (OCIE), earlier this
year, she admitted that the SEC’s exam staff is overextended.”).
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B. The Former Registration Regime’s Virtually Presumptive Exemption
Absent an exemption, an investment adviser was generally required
to register with the SEC. 36 The proposal of the revised and so-called
“Hedge Fund Rule” 37 signaled the threat of a sweeping departure from
the former hedge investment adviser regulatory regime. Section
203(b)(3) of the Advisers Act formerly excluded hedge fund investment
advisers from registration requirements (among other regulatory
requirements), provided only that direct investment advice was given to
less than fifteen “clients,” a figure that was formerly tabulated by the
number of private fund entities directly advised. 38 For purposes of
determining an adviser exemption, a rolling prior twelve month client
counting method was used. 39 Many hedge fund investment advisers had
36. See generally § 203(b)(3) of Advisers Act 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(3) [hereinafter
Registration of Investment Advisers]; see 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3a which states that:
No investment adviser that is regulated or required to be regulated as an investment
adviser in the State in which it maintains its principal office and place of business
shall register under section 80b-3 of this title, unless the investment adviser(A) has assets under management of not less than $25,000,000, or such higher amount
as the Commission may, by rule, deem appropriate in accordance with the purposes of
this subchapter;

15 U.S.C. § 80b-3a(a)(1)(A); 17 C.F.R. § 275-203A-1 [Eligibility for SEC
Registration]; 17 CFR 275.203A-2 [Exemptions from prohibition on SEC registration];
Goldstein Complaint, supra note 15, at ¶ 25.
[T]he Commission estimates that approximately half of the advisors [sic] to large
hedge fends [sic] are currently registered. Advisers who have 15 or more clients,
whether funds or individuals, to whom they provide personalized advice must register
because they do not fall within the terms of the exemption. Many advisers, even
though exempt, also register with the Commission voluntarily for competitive reasons
or because their investors demand it.

Id.
37.
38.

See SEC’s Appell. Brief, supra note 5.
Rule 203(b)(3) of the Advisers Act 17; CFR § 275.203(b)(3) (adopted by the
SEC in late 2004).
But see Rule 203(b)(3)-2 of the Advisers Act 17;
CFR § 275.203(b)(3)-2 (adopted by the SEC in late 2004). This required an investment
adviser of a “private fund” to look through and count each investor of the fund as a
single client – for purposes of Adviser Act registration requirement. This rule was
vacated by Goldstein. See Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 876 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
39. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(3); Rule 203(b)(3)-1; 17 C.F.R. § 275.203(b)(3)-1).
Vacated by Goldstein, 473 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006). Advisers to private pooled
investments, such as hedge funds, depended on the SEC Staff’s perspective that a
private fund, rather than the beneficial owner-investors in that fund, was considered to
be the firm’s “client” for purposes of the exemption provided in § 203(b)(3) of the
Advisers Act. This “private adviser exemption” provision was codified in Advisers Act
Rule 203(b)(3)-1, which allows a “private fund” to be treated as a “client” for purposes
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previously been exempted from the Advisers Act registration
provisions, 40 despite the fact that the Act was “[e]nacted by Congress to
‘substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat
emptor’ in the investment advisory profession,” 41
Under the statute, an investment adviser was considered to be
exempt from registration provided it (i) had fourteen or fewer “clients” 42
during the preceding twelve months, (ii) did not hold itself out generally
to the public as an investment adviser, and (iii) was not an adviser to any

of the § 203(b)(3) exemption, provided the investment advice given to the “private
fund” was based on the fund-client’s financial objectives rather than the individual
investment objectives of the fund’s investors. Id. However, the Rule provided at least
one alternative method for counting “clients”:
The 1985 “Safe Harbor” of Rule 203(b)(3)-1 is not the only method for determining
who might be considered a “client” for purposes of § 203(b)(3). For example,
paragraph (a)(2) of the Rule indicates that an Adviser may count as one client any
“corporation, general partnership, limited partnership, limited liability company,
trust . . . or other legal organization . . . to which [the Adviser] provide[s] investment
advice based on its investment objectives rather than the individual investment
objectives of its shareholders, partners, limited partners, members, or
beneficiaries . . . .”

Id. (quoting § 203(a)(2)). As such, an Adviser with investment discretion over less than
15 “clients” was not required to register with the SEC. This rule was apparently
adopted to address the inference drawn by Abrahamson v. Fleschner, which held that a
limited partnership’s general partner investing in securities was considered an
“investment adviser” within the context of the Advisers Act. Abrahamson v. Fleschner,
568 F.2d 862 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978) overruled on other
grounds by Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
Incidentally, the first circulated opinion in Abrahamson indicated that the limited
partners were also considered to be “clients” under this standard, but that portion of the
opinion was redacted from the amended published version according to the SEC’s
Appell. Brief. See SEC’s Appell. Brief, supra note 5, at 22 n.7 (citing Robert Hacker &
Ronald Rotunda, SEC Registration of Private Investment Partnerships after
Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1471, 1484 n.72 (1978)) (“The court’s
original opinion stated, ‘the general partners were the investment advisers to the limited
partners.’ The court’s amended opinion deleted ‘to the limited partners.’”).
40. See generally Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund
Advisers, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2266 (July 20, 2004), 69 Fed. Reg.
45,172 (July 28, 2004).
41. See Goldstein, 436 F.3d at 876 (citing SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau,
Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963)).
42. In order to comply with the so-called “Hedge Fund Rule,” investment advisers
were required to “look through” and count each shareholder, limited partner, member or
beneficiary of a “private fund” towards the fourteen or fewer client threshold of the
“private adviser exemption.” Rule 203(b)(3)-2 of the Advisers Act.
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registered investment company. 43 The practical effect of the former
Rule with its broad exemption provisions was that virtually all hedge
fund advisers had been eligible for exemption and could avoid
registration altogether. It permitted hedge fund advisers freedom to
operate in a largely secretive manner, without interference or federal
oversight and in stark contrast with the above referenced “full
disclosure” philosophy of the 1940 Advisers Act. 44
C. Regulatory Response to Hedge Fund Growth and
Perceived Secondary Effects
Responding to the accelerating trend of explosive hedge fund
growth, the Commission directed its staff to undertake a comprehensive
investigation of hedge fund activities in 2002. 45 The SEC staff produced
an extensive study in 2003 that identified key areas for concern
regarding the changing dynamics of the hedge fund sector—some of the
notable potential underlying problems identified by the 2003 SEC report
included (i) a lack of information regarding what is arguably the fastest-

43. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(3). Exempted “private advisers” remain subject to
anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws. See, e.g., § 10(b) of the 1934
Securities Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 thereunder (15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) and
17 C.F.R. § 240-10b.5); § 206 of the Advisers Act (15 U.S.C. § 80b-6).
44. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
45. See 2003 SEC Staff Report, supra note 23; see also Registration Under the
Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg. 72,054 (Dec. 10, 2004)
(codified at 17 C.F.R. Parts 275 and 279 (2004), available at 2004 WL 2825810
[hereinafter Investment Adviser Registration Final Rule]). The Hedge Fund Advisers
Rule took effect on February 10, 2005 “except for the amendments to § 275.206(4)-2
[Rule 206(4)-2] and § 279.1 [Form ADV], which bec[a]me effective January 10, 2005.”
Id. The 2003 SEC Staff Report made a number of findings that formed the primary
bases for implementing the Hedge Fund Adviser Rule:
In 2002, we requested that our staff investigate the activities of hedge funds and hedge
fund advisers. First, we were aware that the number and size of hedge funds were
rapidly growing and that this growth could have broad consequences for the securities
markets for which we are responsible. Second, we were bringing a growing number
of enforcement cases in which hedge fund advisers defrauded hedge fund investors,
who typically were able to recover few of their assets. Third, we were concerned that
the activities of hedge funds today might affect a broader group of persons than the
relatively few wealthy individuals and families who had historically invested in hedge
funds. We directed the staff to develop information for us on a number of related
topics, and advise us whether we should exercise greater regulatory authority over the
hedge fund industry.

Id. at 72,055 n.15 (internal citation omitted).
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growing sector of the U.S. financial system, (ii) an increasing incidence
of fraudulent activity involving hedge fund advisers, and (iii) a trend
towards “retailization” (hedge fund investments held by less
sophisticated individuals (see Part III.B.3 below)). 46 The 2003 SEC
Staff Report findings served as the primary bases for promulgation of
the Rule at issue in Goldstein.
After the SEC staff review and in apparent response to its reported
findings, 47 the Commission adopted a revised investment adviser
registration Rule 48 that would effectively govern a wide swath of the
hedge fund sector by and through its grant of regulatory authority
pursuant to the Advisers Act. 49 The Advisers Act established the
boundaries of conduct for a segment of registered advisers under the
prior registration regime since 1970 50 and regulated certain aspects of
46. Id. at 72,055 (citing 2003 SEC Staff Report, see supra note 23). The SEC
implementation of the Rule noted concern regarding the explosive growth of hedge
funds and the increasing influence over the capital markets:
In September 2003, the staff published a report entitled Implications of the Growth of
Hedge Funds. The 2003 Staff Hedge Fund Report describes the operation of hedge
funds and raises a number of important public policy concerns. The report focused on
investor protection concerns raised by the growth of hedge funds. The 2003 Staff
Hedge Fund Report confirmed and further developed several of our concerns
regarding hedge funds and hedge fund advisers.

Id.
47.
48.

Investment Adviser Registration Final Rule, supra note 45.
See Id.; 17 C.F.R. § 275.203 (b)(3)-1 (Rule 203 (b)(3)); The Investment
Company Amendments Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, 84 Stat. 1413 (1970)
[hereinafter 1970 Amendments Act] (Prior to 2004, investment advisers with fewer than
15 “client” during the preceding 12 months, were specifically exempted from Section
203(b)(3) of the Advisers Act; Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 879 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
The Goldstein court looked to the 1970 amendment of the Advisers Act for inferences
of how Congress contemplated counting “clients”:
On the other hand, a 1970 amendment to § 203 appears to reflect Congress’s
understanding at the time that investment company entities, not their shareholders,
were the advisers’ clients. In the amendment, Congress eliminated a separate
exemption from registration for advisers who advised only investment companies and
explicitly made the fewer-than-fifteen-clients exemption unavailable to such advisers.
Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, § 24, 84 Stat.
1413, 1430 (1970). This latter prohibition would have been unnecessary if the
shareholders of investment companies could be counted as “clients.”

Goldstein, 473 F.3d at 879.
49. See Advisers Act, supra note 14; see also “Rules Under the Investment Adviser
Act,” 17 C.F.R. § 275.01; and SEC 2003 Staff Report, supra note 23.
50. See 1970 Amendments Act, supra note 48; see Goldstein Complaint, supra
note 15, at ¶ 26 (“[A]ll advisers, registered or unregistered, must report beneficial
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unregistered investment advisers to a lesser extent. 51 The Rule and its
new method of client counting had seemingly closed the loophole that
the hedge fund sector had previously relied upon for almost unfettered
opacity.
In order to determine whether an investment adviser was eligible
for exemption from registration pursuant to the proposed and so-called
“Hedge Fund Rule,” 52 hedge fund managers were required to count each
individual investor-shareholder of a private fund under management as a
separate “client” (instead of the former method of counting only the
private fund entities that directly received investment advice as
“clients”). 53 As a result, almost every hedge fund adviser in America
would no longer be exempt and would be potentially subject to the
registration requirements, based on the Rule’s more inclusive new
definition of “client,” as well as being subjected to periodic SEC audits,
required filings and disclosures, restrictions on the charging of
performance fees and the possibility of unannounced SEC examinations
of books and records. 54
ownership of securities in excess of a certain amount under Section 13(d) and (g) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”), and must further file quarterly
reports of security positions under Section 13(f) of the Exchange Act if they manage in
excess of $100 million in assets.”).
51. See 2003 SEC Staff Report, supra note 23, at 88-89 (The SEC adoption of the
main recommendation of the 2003 Staff Report to amend Rule 203(b)(3)-1 of the
Advisers Act (the “Safe Harbor Rule”), eliminated that “safe harbor” by requiring
managers of so-called “private funds” to count as a separate client each investor
(beneficial owner/shareholder) in a hedge fund); 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(3) (2000) (Small
Advisor Exemption); 17 C.F.R. § 275.203(b)(3)-1(a)(2)(i) (2003) (allowing
corporations, limited and general partnerships, and limited liability companies to be
counted as single “clients”); see also Goldstein Complaint, supra note 15, at ¶ 20.
52. See 1970 Amendments Act, supra note 48 (discussing investment advisers and
their affiliates, and mutual fund directors; breach of fiduciary duty was addressed in this
amendment in Section 36).
53. In order to comply with the so-called “Hedge Fund Rule,” Advisers were
required to “look through” and count each shareholder, limited partner, member, or
other investor of a “private fund” towards the fourteen or fewer “client” threshold of the
“private adviser exemption.” See Investment Adviser Registration Final Rule, supra
note 45, at 72,065.
Our actions today withdraw that safe harbor and require advisers to “private funds”—
which will include most hedge funds—to “look through” the funds to count the
number of investors as “clients” for purposes of the private adviser exemption.

Id.
54. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 80b-4 [hereinafter Reports by Investment Advisers];
Steven B. Nadel, U.S. Regulation of Private Investment Funds, 37 REV. OF SEC. &
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It is a distinct possibility that the SEC encountered pressure to
accelerate its hedge fund regulation in the aftermath of the mutual fund
market timing scandal that Massachusetts Secretary of the
Commonwealth William Galvin characterized as allowing “hedge funds
[to] buy shares in mutual funds is like putting a shark in a goldfish
tank.” 55 Perhaps it was a source of embarrassment at the federal level
that then-New York Attorney General, Eliot Spitzer, swept in with the
extensive powers of the Martin Act 56 and demanded substantial
COMMODITIES REG. 47 (Mar. 17, 2004), available at http://www.sewkis.com
/Documents/attachments/599.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2007).
55. See Investment Adviser Registration Final Rule, supra note 45, at 72,057.
Perhaps most disturbing is that hedge fund advisers have been key participants in the
recent scandals involving late trading and inappropriate market timing of mutual fund
shares. See also Goldstein Complaint, supra note 15, at ¶ 37. See also Allan Sloan,
The Mutual Fund Scandal: Unfair Fight, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 8, 2003, available at
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/3606191/ (last visited Dec. 5, 2006). Newsweek
reported that the SEC has been playing catch-up to state regulators like Mr. Spitzer and
Massachusetts Secretary of the Commonwealth William Galvin:
Hedge funds have been involved in most of the allegations of wrong-doing, which
first surfaced in September when New York’s Spitzer brought a case against four fund
companies and a big hedge fund, Canary Capital.
[William] Galvin, the
Massachusetts secretary of [the Commonwealth], says, “Letting hedge funds buy
shares in mutual funds is like putting a shark in a goldfish tank.” The SEC, which is
supposed to regulate mutual funds, has been scrambling to catch up with Spitzer and
Galvin, and has vowed changes.

Id.
56. NY GEN. BUS. LAW, Art. 23-A, § 352 (McKinney 1996); see also Janice Revell
and David Stires, Making Sense of the Mutual Fund Scandal Everything you may not
want to ask (but really should know) about the crisis that’s rocking the investment
world, FORTUNE, Nov. 24, 2003, http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_
archive/2003/11/24/353794/index.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2006) [hereinafter Revell].
CNN Money reported that Mr. Spitzer’s market timing investigation led to “widespread
criticism” of the SEC, including from at least one former Commission staff attorneys:
How did the scandal get started?
The crisis erupted in September, when New York attorney general Eliot Spitzer
alleged that four mutual fund companies had struck illicit relationships with Canary
Capital Partners, a New Jersey hedge fund. Spitzer charged that Bank of America’s
fund business allowed Canary to trade several funds after the markets had already
closed at that day’s prices. Known as “late trading,” this illegal practice allowed
Canary to trade on after-hours news (such as earnings announcements) at beforeclosing prices. Spitzer also charged that Banc One, Janus, and Strong (see “Up
Against the Wall”) allowed Canary to quickly jump in and out of their mutual funds to
make a fast profit, a practice known as “market timing.” While market timing is not
illegal per se, fund companies can violate securities law if they state in their fund
prospectuses that they discourage market timing but then make exceptions for “select”
investors or their own employees. . . . Industry experts say that market timing of

928

FORDHAM JOURNAL OF
CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

Vol. XII

monetary concessions as a result of alleged “front-running”
malfeasance. 57 SEC staffers apparently first learned of Mr. Spitzer’s
enforcement conquest in published reports only after the New York
Attorney General’s office had already hammered out the first of its
market timing settlements. 58 It remains possible, as the Goldstein
petitioners pleadings strongly suggested, that state regulatory prowess
may have contributed to the SEC’s motivation to expand its hedge fund
oversight authority. 59 During a recent visit to Fordham University
mutual fund shares is hardly a new phenomenon. And the SEC’s failure to lead the
way in uncovering recent scandals has led to widespread criticism of the commission.
The SEC does perform detailed inspections of mutual fund firms every three years or
so, about 90% of which result in the issuance of “deficiency letters,” which outline
ethical violations ranging from minor to extremely serious. But fund management
doesn’t have to disclose the contents of the deficiency letters either to fund
shareholders or to its own board of directors. “Ninety-five percent of what managers
are doing wrong never is made public,” says Edward Siedle, a former attorney for the
SEC who now investigates abuses at money-management firms for pension funds. If
they were, he adds, they would be guaranteed to scare off a lot of investors.

Id.
57. See, e.g., N.Y. Att’y Gen. Dep’t of Law Press Release, Spitzer, SEC Reach
Largest Mutual Fund Settlement Ever, Bank of America, FleetBoston Agree to Pay
$675 Million and Adopt Precedent-Setting Reforms to Improve Accountability, Mar. 15,
2004, available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press /2004/mar/mar15c_04.html; see
also Revell, supra note 56. CNN Money reported that mutual fund “front-running” was
on the SEC’s regulatory radar as early as 1998:
[A] 1998 deficiency letter [was] issued by the SEC to a firm that was later purchased
by one of the country’s largest mutual funds. The letter contains details of more than
two dozen occasions when a senior executive bought and sold individual stock
positions in his personal account before trading the same stocks for his clients—a
highly unethical (and in many circumstances illegal) kind of trading known as frontrunning.

Id.
58. See, e.g., New York Attorney General, press release, State Investigation
Reveals Mutual Fund Fraud, Sept. 3, 2003, available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us
/press/2003/sep/sep03a_03.html.
Attorney General Eliot Spitzer announced today that his office has obtained evidence
of widespread illegal trading schemes that potentially cost mutual fund shareholders
billions of dollars annually.
Spitzer announced that one of the perpetrators of the schemes – a hedge fund and its
managers – has agreed to make restitution $30 million in illegal profits generated
from unlawful trading and pay a $10 million penalty. The agreement further commits
the hedge fund and its officers and employees to continue to cooperate in the Attorney
General’s ongoing investigation of the mutual fund industry.

Id.; Complaint in the Matter of State of New York v. Canary Capital Partners, LLC et
al., available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2003/sep/canary_complaint.pdf.
59. See Goldstein Complaint, supra note 15, at ¶¶ 36-38.
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School of Law, Governor Spitzer (then-New York Attorney General)
remarked that the controversial registration regime “will not reveal any
of the underlying problems.” 60 Mr. Spitzer’s successor, Attorney
General Andrew M. Cuomo, has followed suit and not articulated any
60. Former N.Y. Attorney General Eliot Spitzer Remarks, Fifth Annual Albert A.
DeStefano Lecture on Corporate, Securities & Financial Law at Fordham University, 11
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 1, 27-28 (2005). Governor Spitzer commented to an
audience at Fordham University School of Law:
I do not have any plans for hedge-fund regulation. Occasionally - more than
occasionally - I am asked, “Do you think the SEC is doing something smart or not in
requiring hedge funds to register?” I do not think there is any great harm that results
from it. I also don’t think there is any great good. The reason for that is that the
registration form itself will not reveal any of the underlying problems.
Hedge funds do some bad things. Hedge funds sometimes take short positions and
intentionally circulate misinformation to try to drive the stock down, to benefit from a
short position. But that is not a game that is intrinsic to being a hedge fund. In other
words, there is nothing about the hedge-fund structure, as a structure, that I have seen
that is problematic. In fact, I would argue that, in a way, a hedge fund is more closely
aligned with the interest of its investor, because usually, the way their fees are
structured, you get one percent, two percent as a fee, and then an override. So the
fund manager wants to do well, wants to perform well, and his investors will do well
as a result.
The improprieties come in their trading practices. Those trading practices have to be
addressed, and should be addressed. But those are not trading practices that result
because they are hedge funds. They are just games that are played in the marketplace
on a regular basis by all sorts of investors.
One area where hedge funds do often get into trouble is in valuation of their portfolio.
The reason for that does go back to the compensation system. If a hedge-fund
manager gets an override, if you have been up by more than twenty percent in any
given year, if you have a portfolio of liquid stocks, you can mark-to-market every day.
That is easy. If you have a portfolio of thinly traded debt, then you can come up with a
valuation that may not be a real one, go back to your investors and say, “Look at what
a great year we had. You owe me ‘X’ dollars,” and it may not be a real market
valuation.
But that is, I think, a secondary issue.

Id.; see Alex Akesson, Hedge Funds Sued by Attorney General, HEDGECO.NET, Nov.
17,
2006,
http://www.hedgeco.net/news/11/2006/hedge-funds-sued-by-attorneygeneral.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2006). A hedge fund news website noted that Mr.
Spitzer alleged that certain hedge funds were involved in the alleged market timing
schemes:
State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer sued Samaritan Asset Management Services Inc,
their advisors, Johnson Capital Management Inc, and Edward Owens, a principal at
the hedge fund. The company allegedly engaged in a fraudulent mutual fund markettiming scheme. The defendants secretly “piggy-backed” their trades on the
investment accounts of retirement plans. The suit claims that the market timing trades
hurt long-term investors and the suit seeks restitution and an order to stop them from
carrying out improper trades.

Akesson, Hedge Funds Sued by Attorney General, HEDGECO.NET.
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state registration program for hedge fund investment advisers as a
regulatory priority. 61 SEC Commissioner Paul Atkins wondered in a
New York Bar Association speech whether SEC staff members had not
funneled data into the hedge fund category in order to justify and
According to
facilitate the registration rule-making agenda. 62
Commissioner Atkins, the SEC “rushed this rule with little analysis or
consideration to the ramifications.” 63 Mr. Atkins has also quoted former

61. See, e.g., Russ Buettner, Cuomo Turns to Hedge Fund and It Pays Off, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 6, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/06/nyregion/06hedge.html?ex=
1317787200&en=5092a7fa664cad61&ei=5090&partner=rssuserland&emc=rss
(last
visited Dec. 6, 2006) (reporting that “[t]wo years ago, Andrew M. Cuomo put more
than half of his campaign treasury into a hedge fund, making him one of the few New
York politicians to invest campaign money in anything riskier than a sure bet”); A
campaign hedge: Andrew Cuomo realizes a nice return by investing in a high yield
fund, ALBANY TIMES-UNION, Oct. 11, 2006. Mr. Cuomo’s campaign for New York
Attorney General actually invested a portion of its political “war chest” in a hedge fund:
In the case of Andrew Cuomo, the Democratic candidate for attorney general, an
investment of $750,000 of campaign contributions in a hedge fund two years ago paid
off nicely—with a return of almost 20 percent in just a year. It also represents a
particularly slippery slope for a business, political fundraising, that already smacks of
high stakes . . . . In Mr. Cuomo’s case, some special arrangements were made,
including the waiving of minimum investment requirements by EnTrust, according to
a New York Times report.
As it happens, Mr. Cuomo is also as committed to sweeping campaign finance reform
as anyone on the ballot in New York this year. He speaks of a determination to
enforce all available laws to end the culture of pay to play that pervades state
government.

Id.
62. See Speech, supra note 35. Commissioner Atkins stated that:
It is true that the rule’s proponents have an incentive to find problems in order to show
how necessary the rule was in the first place. I anticipate a bandying about of hedge
fund fraud statistics as evidence that the registration mandate was long overdue. My
experience with hedge fund fraud statistics before the adoption of the rule means that I
will look at such statistics with a skeptical eye. As Commissioner Glassman’s and my
analysis of the cases that were cited in support the rule revealed, lots of types of cases
get labeled as hedge fund cases. The 51 cases that were cited in the Adopting Release
as evidence of a, “troubling growth in the number of our hedge fund fraud
enforcement cases” largely implicated advisors who would have been too small to be
registered with the Commission, were already registered in some capacity, should
have been registered, or were simply garden-variety fraudsters. The cynic in me
wonders whether, if the Commission decides to turn its attention to venture capital
and private equity funds, the “hedge fund” cases will get relabeled.

Id. (citing Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2266 (July 20, 2004), 69 FR 45171,
(July 28, 2004)).
63. See Lee Conrad, Compliance: Hedge Fund Registration Sparks Broad
BANKER,
Dec.
2004,
available
at
http://www.usCriticism,
US
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Federal Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan who stated that the “initiative
Former
cannot accomplish what it seeks to accomplish.” 64
Commissioner Cynthia A. Glassman has also publicly remarked that the
former SEC Chairman Donaldson era remnant 65 was little more than a
“heavy-handed way of regulating the hedge fund industry,” 66 and
apparently many industry professionals shared Ms. Glassman’s pointed
observations. 67 The Rule was presumably designed to eliminate the
availability of the private adviser exemption for “essentially all” 68
advisers, and bring much of the hedge fund sector under the specter of
federal regulatory oversight, pushing all but a slim minority of advisers
beyond the newly defined threshold. 69 However, as Commissioner
Atkins suggested, it may have been the hurried pace of promulgation
that led to the Rule’s demise.
D. Proposed “Hedge Fund Rule” Met With Industry Resistance
The controversial registration regime was met with “vigorous
dissent” from two of five SEC Commissioners and faced zealous

banker.com/article.html?id=20041201J3Q4VGSK (last visited April 24, 2007).
64. Id.
65. William H. Donaldson was SEC Chairman when the so-called “Hedge Fund
Rule” rule-making process was initiated. See SEC Biography: Chairman William H.
Donaldson, available at http://www.sec.gov/about/commissioner/donaldson.htm (last
visited Dec. 5, 2006).
66. Kevin J. Shay, SEC Member Dismayed that SOX Costs, Burdens Still High,
GAZETTE,
Nov.
4,
2005,
available
at
http://gazette.net
BETHESDA
/stories/110405/businew180555_31896.shtml (last visited April 24, 2007).
67. See Conrad, supra note 63.
The [SEC’s] decision to register most of the estimated 8,350 hedge funds is drawing
heavy criticism from the business community and some government officials. The SEC
says the rule, passed on October 26 [2004], will help protect investors and decrease
fraud. Nearly 400 hedge funds have been identified by the SEC as being involved in
late trading and inappropriate market-timing cases, which hurts mutual-fund investors
because mutual funds are large enough to be market movers, the agency says.
Id.
68. See Goldstein Complaint, supra note 15, at 1.
69. See C. Evan Stewart, The Wrong Track to Reforming Corporate Governance,
GC NEW YORK, Oct. 10, 2006, available at http://www.zuckerman.com
/media/news/media.168.pdf (last visited April 24, 2007) (explaining that in regulating
hedge funds the SEC defined registration as “inter alia: (i) filing disclosures on Form
ADV; (ii) adopting a compliance program; (iii) adopting a code of ethics; and (iv) being
subject to SEC examinations”).
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industry opposition. 70 Nonetheless, a sharply divided SEC adopted the
Rule, portions of which took effect on January 10, 2005 (certain other
remaining aspects took effect on February 10, 2005). 71 All affected
advisers were to have registered via “Form ADV” 72 and employ the
other newly promulgated requirements not later than February 1, 2006. 73
The proposed Rule ignited one of the more widely reported regulatory
conflicts in recent market history, and included publication of both
Commissioner Atkins’s and Glassman’s dissents. 74
A significant number of hedge fund investment advisers who had
previously relied upon the “private adviser exemption” in order to avoid
registration with the SEC were faced with the dilemma of whether to
register in compliance with the Rule, find a new “loophole” to exempt
them from registration, or to simply disobey the new disclosure

70. See Kenneth J. Berman et al., Hedge Fund Investment Advisers: To Be or Not
to Be (Registered)?, 20 INVESTMENT ADVISER 9, Sept. 2006, at 11 n.6; Speech, supra
note 35 (Commissioner Atkins noted that, “[a]s you know, in October of 2004, one
week before the 2004 elections, the Commission adopted the hedge fund registration
mandate over my objections and those of my colleague, Commissioner Glassman”).
At the meeting adopting the rule, Commissioner Glassman famously asked the staff if
they had talked to the other regulators regarding alternatives to our registration
requirement. Upon getting the response that yes, they had, she asked: “Well, did you
listen to what they had to say?”

Id. (emphasis added).
71. Investment Adviser Registration Final Rule, supra note 45. The Final Rule, as
published, included the dissent of Commissioners Atkins and Glassman in a section
titled, “Dissent of Commissioners Cynthia A. Glassman and Paul S. Atkins to the
Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers”:
Four months ago, the majority proposed to regulate hedge fund advisers over our
dissent. We were nevertheless hopeful that a careful review of commentary on the
proposal would convince the majority, instead of taking further action on this
proposal, to consider better alternatives. Our hope was fueled by the fact that many
commenters offered excellent insights and recommendations to the Commission. We
are disappointed that the majority, unmoved by the chorus of credible concerns from
diverse voices, has determined to adopt the hedge fund registration rules largely as
proposed. As discussed below, we continue to agree that we need more information
on hedge funds, but we disagree with the majority’s solution.

Id.
72. See SEC Form ADV, available at http://sec.gov/answers/formadv.htm (last
visited Apr. 13, 2007).
73. See, e.g., Reports by Investment Advisers, supra note 55 (Hedge Fund
Investment Adviser books and records requirement and SEC power of examination);
see Goldstein Complaint, supra note 15, at ¶ 21; see also Conrad, supra note 63.
74. See Investment Adviser Registration Final Rule, supra note 45.
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regime. 75 Many advisers increased the “lock-up periods” for their funds
in order to circumvent the reporting requirements. 76 Many other
advisers apparently elected to comply with the Rule, but according to
Commissioner Atkins, a significant number of leading hedge funds
chose to disregard the Rule. 77
And at least one hedge fund adviser, market maverick Phillip
Goldstein, 78 the irascible manager of the “Bulldog Investors” fund
75.
76.

See § 203(b)(3) of Advisers Act, supra note 36.
See, e.g., Susan L. Barreto, Hedge Fund Adviser Registration Tops 2,000 PostGoldstein, INVESTMENT ADVISOR, Aug. 7, 2006 (“The experience of Sellers Capital
sums up the choices many hedge fund managers faced in deciding whether or not to
register. The firm’s founder, Mark A. Sellers, originally imposed a two-year lock-up
and told investors that if they didn’t want the longer lock-up they needed to invest
before Feb. 1 [2006]”), available at http://www.investmentadvisor.com/article.php
?topic=Hedge+Funds&article=6717; see Bingham-McCutchen, Hedge Fund Ruling:
What’s Next?, INVESTMENT MGMT. ALERT , June 2006, at n.2 (“Many hedge fund
managers chose not to register by instituting a two-year lock-up as to all new
investments received on or after February 1, 2006, which allowed them to continue to
count the fund as the client rather than each of the investors in the fund.”), available at
In
The
http://www.bingham.com/bingham/webadmin/documents/radD7D5C.pdf;
Matter Of: Bulldog Investors General Partnership et al., Docket No. E-07-0002, at 70,
available at http://www.sec.state.ma.us/sct/sctpdf/bulldogcomplaint.pdf (last visited
Feb. 18, 2007); Massachusetts Commonwealth Secretary’s Exhibit C-4, GoldsteinDakos “Dear Partner” letter dated July 13, 2006.
Like many other respected and successful private investment partnerships, we recently
instituted a two-year lockup for new contributions . . . . A secondary benefit was that
a two-year lockup allowed us to avoid the costly red tape that goes with registration
while our lawsuit was pending . . . . Assuming the SEC does not appeal the
[Goldstein] decision, we may modify the lockup policy.

Id.
77. Commissioner Atkins NY Bar Assoc. Speech, supra note 35 (noting that, “we
have seen more than one thousand new hedge fund advisor registrants . . . . The newly
registered hedge fund advisors have approximately doubled the pool of hedge fund
registrants.”). The number of registered Advisers reportedly more than doubled again
within one month of Commissioner Atkins’s speech: “[b]y June 2006, approximately
2,400 hedge fund advisers had registered with the commission, including more than
1,100 who had registered after Feb. 1 (this is out of a total universe of circa 9,000
funds).” Id.; see also C. Evan Stewart, The Wrong Track to Reforming Corporate
YORK,
Oct.
10,
2006,
available
at
Governance,
GC
NEW
http://www.zuckerman.com/media/news/media.168.pdf (last visited Apr. 13, 2007).
78. Mr. Goldstein refers to himself as “a widely-quoted expert on value investing
available
at
and
corporate
governance.”
BULLDOGINVESTORS.COM,
http://www.bulldoginvestors.com.
The “Bulldog” website utilizes “masking”
technology that conceals most of the site’s “deep links.” Moreover, the “Bulldog”
website was removed from the Internet in response to an administrative action brought

934

FORDHAM JOURNAL OF
CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

Vol. XII

family, stood firm in his defiance of the Rule, alleging that it was invalid
as an arbitrary and capricious abuse of administrative rulemaking
authority under an apparent ultra vires theory, despite the traditional
deference afforded to the Commission’s “substantial discretion as to
whether to proceed by rulemaking or adjudication.” 79 Mr. Goldstein
already had a history of taking the SEC to task, 80 and thrusting his
by Massachusetts Secretary of the Commonwealth William Galvin on January 31, 2007.
See Edward Pekarek, Hogging the Hedge: The “Bulldog’s” 13F Theory May Not Be So
Lucky, 12 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 1077 (2007) at Part VII.D.1 (discussing the
“Bulldog” website and the Massachusetts administrative matter)]. But see the “Internet
Archive,” particularly the “Principals” page of the “Bulldog” website, available at
http://web.archive.org/web/20060116131029/http://www.bulldoginvestors.com/
(last
visited April 24, 2007). Incidentally, the “Press Room” portion of the “Bulldog”
website includes a variety of media articles regarding Mr. Goldstein’s many proxy
battles, but for some reason, barely notes media coverage of Goldstein. See
http://www.bulldoginvestors.com/pdf.php?ID=20 (last visited April 24, 2007); see also
Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
79. Opening Brief of Petitioner at 25, Goldstein v. SEC, No. 04-1434, 2005 WL
1666937 (D.C. Cir. 2005) [hereinafter Goldstein Opening Brief] (“Finally, the Rule is
unreasonable because the SEC’s development and evaluation of the record was arbitrary
and capricious.”); see also id. at 56 (“In sum, the SEC’s development and consideration
of the record was arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable.”). The Goldstein theory of the
case did not specifically allege that SEC rule-making was an ultra vires act, but
repeatedly asserted that the SEC exceeded the authority granted to it by Congress. Id.
This case involves the SEC’s adoption of the Hedge Fund Rule, which requires
advisers to private investment entities known as hedge funds to register under the
Advisers Act. The Rule seeks to do what Congress has precluded the Commission
from doing – regulate private investment entities and advisers that Congress has
expressly exempted from regulation under the Investment Company Act and the
Advisers Act.

Id. at 8 (emphasis added); see also FCC v. Nat’l Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436
U.S. 775, 808 n.29 (1978) (citing SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 201-02 (1947)).
80. See, e.g., Brief for Phillip Goldstein and Bulldog Investors as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondent Dabit in the matter of Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71 (2006), available at 2005 WL 3485822; see Phillip Goldstein
Letter to SEC, Mar. 14, 2004, Re: File No. S7-03-04 Investment Company Governance,
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70304/pgoldstein031404.htm (last visited Dec. 2,
2006) [hereinafter Goldstein Mar. 2004 SEC Letter]. Among the numerous seemingly
taunting letters by Mr. Goldstein, is the following:
Dear Mr. Katz:
In the summer of 1967, some friends and I rented an apartment in Cape Cod. One
day, a girl brought us a turtle she found at a nearby stream. She put the turtle on the
floor to let it acclimate itself to its new home. But the turtle was frightened and
proceeded to walk to the nearest wall. It tried to climb up the wall for what seemed
like hours but it never succeeded because turtles cannot climb walls. Eventually, we
felt sorry for the poor frustrated critter and put it back by the stream.
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opinions into the center of securities law controversies. This time he
took his fight to Washington. 81
Like our turtle, the Commission seems to be unable to grasp a basic truth, i.e., without
appropriate incentives, tinkering with the governance structure of a fund cannot
transform unwilling so-called independent directors into effective monitors of
management.

Id.; see Phillip Goldstein Letter to SEC [hereinafter Goldstein January 2004 SEC
Letter], Jan. 30, 2004, Re: File No. S7-19-03 Security Holder Director Nominations,
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s71903/pgoldstein013004.htm (last
visited Dec. 1, 2006). This mocking missive by Mr. Goldstein includes the absurd
disclaimer to SEC staffers that his “critters” have expressed support:
Dear Mr. Katz:
I want to correct some misconceptions about the proposed proxy rules.
First, a disclaimer. The views expressed herein do not necessarily represent those of
the Securities and Exchange Commission or any of its Commissioners or staff
members, any members of the American Bar Association, the Business Roundtable,
Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz or any other law firm representing corporate
interests, any manager of any publicly traded corporation, my wife, my dog, my cat,
any other member of my immediate family or anyone else although my wife and the
critters have expressed support.

Id. (emphasis added); see also Phillip Goldstein Letter to SEC, Dec. 22, 2003, Re: File
No. S7-19-03 Security Holder Director Nominations http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed
/s71903/pgoldstein122203.htm quoting Bob Dylan “Blowin’ in the Wind” © 1962. (last
visited Dec. 1, 2006). Mr. Goldstein wrote to the SEC in December 2003, citing Bob
Dylan and making the ludicrous comparison between the nascent Iraqi democracy and
proxy voting:
The plain fact is that many persons are currently sitting in director’s [sic] chairs who
would not be there if the Commission had adopted a rule that ensured that
stockholders had a fair opportunity to vote for any bona fide nominee. That was true
in 1934 and that will continue to be true whether or not the Commission adopts rule
[sic] 14a-11 as proposed. As Bob Dylan put it:
Yes, ‘n’ how many years can some people exist
Before they’re allowed to be free?
Yes, ‘n’ how many times can a man turn his head,
Pretending he just doesn’t see?
The answer, my friend, is blowin’ in the wind,
The answer is blowin’ in the wind.
I hope the wind reaches 450 Fifth Street [SEC’s Washington, D.C. address] in my
lifetime. Until then, shame on anyone and everyone at the Commission who is
responsible for not acting forcefully to eliminate the continuing disenfranchisement of
stockholders and for producing a lame “compromise” proposal!
In its bloated release, the Commission solicits responses to more than two hundred
questions, most of which have nothing to do with ensuring that proxies are not utilized
so as to frustrate fair corporate elections. I have just one question for the
Commission.
Who will get fair elections first: Iraqi citizen or American
stockholders? American stockholders eagerly await a response.

Id.
81.

See generally Goldstein Complaint, supra note 15; see also Goldstein v. SEC,
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III. MR. GOLDSTEIN GOES TO WASHINGTON
Just eleven days after the SEC published the final Rule, 82 the
Goldstein petitioners 83 filed substantially similar administrative agency
review petitions concurrently with both the District Court for the District
of Columbia and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit, ostensibly due to perceived jurisdictional ambiguities. 84 The
district court action was later stayed, pending the decision in the circuit
court, pursuant to an unopposed petitioners’ motion. 85 The Goldstein
petitioners’ pleadings stated that the challenge arose under the
Administrative Procedure Act, as well as the Advisers Act. 86 Their
pleadings also prominently relied upon the definitions of “client” and
“investment adviser” as derived from the U.S. Supreme Court’s
interpretation in Lowe v. SEC, and asserted that within the context of the
Advisers Act, the SEC definition was arbitrary. 87
451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
82. See generally Investment Adviser Registration Final Rule, supra note 45.
83. The named petitioners in the pleadings first filed in the D.C. District Court
included: Phillip Goldstein and Goldstein-controlled entities Kimball & Winthrop, Inc.
and Opportunity Partners L.P. See Goldstein Complaint, supra note 15, at ¶¶ 8-10.
84. See Goldstein Opening Brief, supra note 79, at 4 (citing Investment Co. Inst. v.
Board of Governors, 551 F.2d 1270, 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1977)) (“Decisions of this Court
indicate that where an agency’s governing statute provides for direct review of agency
‘orders,’ but is unclear whether agency ‘rules’ are reviewable in the court of appeals,
uncertainties about jurisdiction are resolved in favor of appellate court review.”).
85. See generally Petitioners’ Motion, with Respondent’s Consent, to Stay
Proceedings, Pending Decision in Related Action by the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit, 2004 WL 3144173 (D.D.C.) (filed Jan. 13, 2004);
id. at ¶ 5. The Goldstein petitioners stated with respect to question of the proper forum
for the challenge of the Rule:
On January 12, 2005, counsel for Plaintiffs and counsel for the SEC conferred by
telephone regarding their views and positions regarding the proper forum for review
of the Hedge Fund Rule. Counsel for the SEC stated that the SEC believes the proper
forum is the Court of Appeals and wants to avoid the wasteful duplication of litigating
in both forums. Counsel for Plaintiffs stated that they also believe the proper forum is
the Court of Appeals but that Plaintiffs do not want to be delayed in challenging the
Hedge Fund Rule in this Court if the Court of Appeals determines that this Court is
the proper forum.

Id.
86.
87.

See 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (“APA”); see also Adviser Act, supra note 14.
See Goldstein Complaint, supra note 15, at ¶ 18, citing Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S.
181 (1985) (“[A]fter reviewing the legislative history of the Advisers Act, that the act
was ‘designed to apply to those persons engaged in; the investment-advisory profession
- those who provide personalized advice attuned to a client’s concerns, whether by
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A “Client” By Any Other Name
The Goldstein petitioners’ pleadings contended that in order to
determine whether a hedge fund adviser was eligible for the “private
adviser” exemption, one must first interpret the essence of the definition
of the term “client,” and discern the legislative intent of the statutory
construction within the Advisers Act. The Goldstein petitioners asserted
that the congressional intent was consistent with that articulated in the
1985 U.S. Supreme Court decision Lowe v. SEC, and that it necessarily,
albeit circularly, turns on whether an adviser “directly” provides
“personalized advice attuned to a client’s concerns.” 88 The Goldstein
pleadings further asserted that, with respect to the 1985 “safe harbor”
provision that created the “private adviser” exemption at issue, that the
Commission
proposed the safe harbor rule to make clear that it would not take the
position that the limited partners of a limited partnership are
“clients” of the general partner, as long as the general partner
provided advice to the limited partnership and did not provide
individualized personal investment advice to the limited partners[,]
[and] [t]he safe harbor rule thus reflected not only the universally
accepted meaning of the term “client,” but also Congress’s desire to
regulate only those persons who render personalized investment
89
advice attuned to a client’s concerns.

The Commission correctly noted in its brief that when promulgating
the Advisers Act, Congress did not establish how one could (or should)
count “clients” for the purposes of the “private adviser” exemption.
This suggests that the Goldstein petitioners’ assertion that the meaning
of “client” was “universally accepted” was somewhat disingenuous. 90
Despite the history of the SEC’s previous use of “client,” the SEC
presented a plausible interpretation of the term that may have persuaded
Congress to amend the Act. 91 Moreover, the Commission specifically
“recognized in proposing the [1985] safe harbor that ‘a different
written or verbal communication.’”) (citing Advisers Act, supra note 14).
88. Lowe, 472 U.S. 181 (1985); see Goldstein Complaint, supra note 15, at ¶ 22.
89. Goldstein Complaint, supra note 15, at ¶ 24 (emphasis added).
90. SEC’s Appell. Brief, supra note 5, at 2.
91. Id. at 2-3 (“[T]he proper construction of the statute might well require an
adviser to count as its clients the investors whose assets were brought under
management through an investment vehicle operated by the adviser, rather than
counting only the vehicle itself.”) (emphasis added).
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approach could be followed in counting clients.’”92
The same year that the SEC adopted the “safe harbor” for general
partners of investment limited partnerships, the U.S. Supreme Court
decided Lowe v. SEC. 93 According to the Goldstein petitioners’ theory
throughout the case, the Rule’s “look through” method of counting
“clients” was inconsistent with congressional intent, with the Supreme
Court’s interpretation of the term in Lowe, 94 and with the SEC’s past use
of the term. 95 In many respects, the entire Goldstein matter, and the fate
of the Rule, would turn on the meaning of a single word.
The Goldstein court identified past instances of SEC interpretations
of the term “client” that substantially undermined the government’s
theory of the case. 96 The court also noted that hedge fund managers
92. Id. at 3 (quoting Investment Advisers Act Release No. 956 (Feb. 22, 1985), 50
Fed. Reg. 8740, 8741 (Mar. 5, 1985) (JA 001, 002)).
93. The SEC correctly noted in its Final Brief that the discussion in Lowe regarding
‘personalized’ versus ‘impersonal’ advice, however, is solely for the purposes of
determining which type of publishers fall within the definition of an investment adviser.
See SEC’s Appell. Brief, supra note 5, at 17 and 34-37; § 202(a)(11) of the Advisers
Act (defining “investment adviser” as “one who ‘engages in the business of advising
others, either directly or through publications or writings.’”) (citing Lowe, 472 U.S. at
188-89 (1985)).
94. See SEC’s Appell. Brief, supra note 5, at 38-39. The Goldstein petitioners
contended the interpretation of the term “client” within Lowe v. SEC should govern the
analysis of the challenged Rule:
Once it is established that an adviser – such as petitioner Kimball & Winthrop here –
directly manages a number of investors’ assets sufficient to render it an ‘investment
adviser’ under the Act, Lowe does not direct how to determine who is the adviser’s
“client” for any purpose . . . . Lowe does not dictate that the adviser’s “clients” are
only those who have a person-to-person relationship with the adviser. It is therefore
entirely consistent with Lowe to conclude that, with respect to “private funds,” each
investor (often a limited [partner] in a fund organized as a limited partnership), who is
receiving the same asset management services from the adviser, can be considered the
adviser’s “client” for purposes of the Section 203(b)(3) private adviser exemption.

Id. (internal citation omitted).
95. Goldstein Opening Brief, supra note 79, at 17 (citing Advisers Act Release No.
983, Definition of “client” of Investment Adviser for Certain Purposes Relating to
Limited Partnerships, 50 Fed. Reg. 29, 206 (July 18, 1985)).
96. Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 876 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (citing 17 C.F.R.
§ 275.203(b)(3)-1) (“[T]he Commission has interpreted this provision to refer to the
partnership or entity itself as the adviser’s ‘client.’”); see Giselle Abramovich, Judges
Grill SEC over Hedge Fund Rule, MONEY MGMT. EXECUTIVE., Dec. 12, 2005, available
at http://www.financial-planning.com/pubs/fpi/20051212101.html (last visited Dec. 3,
2006) (stating that during oral arguments in Goldstein, Circuit Judge Harry Edwards
told the defendant SEC, “You can’t just come in here and say we’re going to make
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“usually satisfy the ‘private adviser exemption,’” 97 and with regard to
the contested definition of “investment adviser,” stated:
Hedge fund general partners meet the definition of “investment
adviser” in the Advisers Act (defining “investment adviser” as one
who “for compensation, engages in the business of advising others,
either directly or through publications or writings, as to the value of
securities or as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or
98
selling securities. . . .”).

1. Whom Does an Adviser Advise?
The Goldstein court placed little weight on the fact that authority it
cited, Abrahamson v. Fleschner, had stated that limited partner investors
did receive investment advice from a general partner in its first
circulated opinion, but that language was redacted from a subsequent
version of the opinion. 99 The SEC highlighted in its brief the language
redacted from the Abrahamson opinion to no avail. 100 By negative
inference, one could presumably surmise that the Second Circuit found
that, at least in its first version of the Abrahamson opinion, limited
partner beneficial owners were recipients of an adviser’s advice, a key
factual criterion for determining whether an investor is a “client,” and
whether a hedge fund adviser might qualify for the “private adviser”
exemption.
Mr. Goldstein did not volunteer to the court that certain investors in
his hedge funds had “different investment objectives and varying
degrees of control of the funds in their brokerage accounts,” and that

‘client’ mean whatever we want because we’re the [SEC] . . . . We have to test your
thesis and your thesis doesn’t stand up.”). Id.
97. Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 876 (citing Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 568 F.2d at 86971 (2d Cir. 1977)) (emphasis added) (holding that hedge fund general partners are
“investment advisers”), overruled in part on other grounds by Transamerica Mortgage
Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
98. Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 876 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (citing Abrahamson v.
Fleschner, 568 F.2d at 869-71 (2d Cir. 1977)) (internal citation omitted).
99. See SEC’s Appell. Brief, supra note 5, at 23 n.7; Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 878-79
(citing Abrahamson, 568 F.2d at 871 n.16) (“The final published opinion omits those
four words [‘to the limited partners’] suggesting that the court expressly declined to
resolve any ambiguity in the term “client.” If – as we generally assume – Congress was
aware of this judicial confusion.”) (emphasis added). Id.
100. See SEC’s Appell. Brief, supra note 5, at 23 n.7.
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some of those investors had testified that they actually consulted with
him regarding the funds’ investments, and even expected him to
consider their advice as it related to the funds’ investment decisions. 101
It seems that those individual investors had highly personalized needs
and objectives, consistent with the term “client,” despite its purportedly
This “universally accepted”
“universally accepted” meaning. 102
terminology, at least according to the Goldstein petitioners’ contention,
was perhaps something upon which reasonable minds could conceivably
disagree, when one considers the findings of the court in Phillip
Goldstein v. Lincoln Nat’l Convertible Securities Fund, Inc. The
omission of the prior testimony of these investors is conspicuous,
irrespective of whether the term “client” is in fact “universally
accepted.”
Despite the omission, the unanimous Goldstein court was
apparently persuaded by the petitioners’ theory, presumably in no small
part because of the examples cited of the Commission’s prior use of
“client” that were consistent with Goldstein’s argument. The court
construed the meaning of “client” in accordance with the petitioners’
position, despite noting that, “the Investment Advisers Act of
101. Phillip Goldstein v. Lincoln Nat’l Convertible Securities Fund, Inc., Case No.
00-2653, Memorandum and Order (E.D. Pa. Apr. 27, 2001), available at
http://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents /opinions/01D0329P.pdf (last visited Dec. 19,
2006). This unrelated civil matter is revealing in terms of who Goldstein may have
directly advised:
¶ 47. Goldstein provided investment advice and money management services to
family, friends and four clients—Opportunity Partners, Mercury Partners, LP
(“Mercury Partners”), Calapasas Investment Partnership (“Calapasas”), and Jasso, Inc.
(“Jasso”). Transcript at 115–22 (testimony of Phillip Goldstein, Apr. 16, 2001).
¶ 48. All of the persons or entities to whom plaintiff offered investment advice and
money management services had different investment objectives and varying degrees
of control of the funds in their brokerage accounts over which Goldstein had
discretionary trading authority; Id. at 53 (testimony of Glenn Goodstein, Apr. 18,
2001) (testifying that decisions as to which securities were bought and sold for
Mercury Partners were made jointly by himself and Goldstein); Id. at 65 (testimony of
Jeff Robertson, Apr. 18, 2001) (testifying that he monitored all trades made on behalf
of Calapasas by Goldstein).
¶ 49. Glenn Goodstein of Mercury Partners, Jeff Robertson of Calapasas, and Jaime
Sohacheski of Jasso, all regularly discussed their investment strategies with
Goldstein. They expected Goldstein to follow their advice on investing their funds. Id.
at 55–56 (testimony of Glenn Goodstein, Apr. 18, 2001); Id. at 66 (testimony of Jeff
Robertson, Apr. 18, 2001); and Id. 78–79 (testimony of Jaime Sohacheski, Apr. 18,
2001).

Id. (internal citations and numbered paragraphs in original) (emphasis added).
102. See Goldstein Complaint, supra note 15, at ¶ 24
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1940, . . . a companion statute to the Investment Company Act of 1940,
and the statute which primarily concerns us in this case [was] [e]nacted
by Congress to ‘substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the
philosophy of caveat emptor’ in the investment advisory profession.” 103
While the court was so exacting about the parsing of the word “client,” it
was apparently far more flexible with the meaning of other words and
phrases.
Fortunately for the Goldstein camp, the issue for debate was not the
parsing of the meaning of the phrase “hedge fund,” as it is not even
mentioned anywhere in the federal securities laws. 104 Just as fortunate
for petitioners was that the debate did not focus upon the meaning of
“full disclosure,” as it might well be considered “universally accepted”
that the word “full” is understood to mean: entire, complete, all,
maximum, absolute, or without exception. 105 Here, however, at least
within the context of an Advisers Act analysis of the “private adviser”
exemption eligibility, “full” usually means something considerably
closer to “half.” 106
Perhaps foreclosing the ability of the SEC to examine hedge fund
advisers books and records was the real underlying motivation for Wall
Street in general, and Mr. Goldstein in particular, to attack the Rule? 107

103. Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 876 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (citing SEC v. Capital
Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963)) (citations omitted) (emphasis
added).
104. Id. at 874-7, citing comments of David A. Vaughan, SEC Roundtable on Hedge
Funds (May 13, 2003), available at http:// www.sec.gov/spotlight/hedgefunds/hedgevaughn.htm (citing fourteen different definitions found in government and industry
publications) (“‘Hedge funds’ are notoriously difficult to define. The term [“hedge
fund”] appears nowhere in the federal securities laws, and even industry participants do
not agree upon a single definition.”) (emphasis added).
105. See
e.g.,
www.dictionary.com
for
definition
of
“full,”
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/full (last visited Dec 27, 2006).
106. See Goldstein Complaint, supra note 15, at ¶ 25 (explaining that
“approximately half of the advisors to large hedge fends [sic] are currently registered”)
(emphasis added); see Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 876 (stating that hedge fund partners
“usually satisfy the ‘private adviser exemption’ from registration in § 203(b)(3) of the
Act.”) (emphasis added).
107. Norman B. Arnoff & Sue C. Jacobs, Professional Liability: The Brandeis
Rules, N.Y.L.J 3, at 3 (Oct. 24, 2006). Arnoff & Jacob’s view of securities regulation
promotes a continuum of interrelated functions:
It is not merely enough for the aspiration to be stated that the highest standards should
prevail, but that these standards have to be given meaningful content with clear notice
to those professionals for which the standards apply. The starting and succeeding
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Some commentators have identified the significance of the so-called
“Hedge Fund Rule,” as it related to Justice Brandeis’s maxim that
sunlight is the “best of disinfectants.” 108 Those critics have also
correctly observed that “professionalism in the securities and financial
services industries will not be meaningfully and effectively developed
by the SEC and other regulators if their ability to inspect a significant
number of investment advisers is curtailed.” 109 The interpretive weight
of Lowe apparently led the Goldstein court to confront the SEC’s
incongruent usage of “client” and “negate[] a rule that merely created a
framework for regulatory oversight and upheld the longstanding secrecy
of hedge funds and their advisers without reference to sound policy
[and] did so in part on the basis of sophistic linguistic analyses.” 110 The
SEC’s unfortunately inconsistent use of a single word proved to be
sufficient to deem the Rule arbitrary, and with that cornerstone removed,
dismantling of the Rule was almost inevitable.

2. The Absence of Any Fiduciary Duty Analysis by
Goldstein and the D.C. Circuit Court
The Goldstein court’s almost singular focus on whether one had
received “personalized advice” as a “client” seemingly ignored the
analytical significance of the concept of fiduciary duty, prominent
throughout U.S. securities law doctrine. 111 The apparent lack of any
points are SEC registration, periodic compliance inspections, pragmatic rule-making
and, in the last instance, SEC enforcement investigations and proceedings when risks
to public investors have not already been abated nor wrongs corrected.

Id.
108. See id. at 1; see also L. Brandeis, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY 62 (Natl. Home
Library Found. ed. 1933).
109. Arnoff & Jacobs, supra note 107 at 1. Arnoff & Jacobs properly questioned the
opacity of the hedge fund sector:
The substantial percentage of hedge fund trading to the overall trading in our capital
markets today mandates judicial or legislative correction. All the Hedge Fund
Adviser Rule did was to place in open, regulatory view the significant activity of
hedge funds and their advisers so that the Brandeis Rule “sunlight is the best
disinfectant,” would have its full force and effect. Professionalism in the securities
and financial services industries will not be meaningfully and effectively developed
by the SEC and other regulators if their ability to inspect a significant number of
investment advisers is curtailed.

Id.
110.
111.

Id. at 3.
See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980) (discussing fiduciary
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measurable consideration of the fiduciary duties owed by an adviser to
its hedge fund investors when evaluating and parsing the term “client,”
left the court’s analysis “seriously flawed” according to at least some
jurisprudence observers. 112 The Tenth Circuit recently performed a
“functional analysis” of the fiduciary duty owed by investment advisers
that is in stark contrast with that of the Goldstein court’s analysis and
decision. 113
duties); see also Arnoff & Jacobs, supra note 107, at 4 (discussing Chiarella’s rule of
law).
[A] financial printer “was able to deduce the names of the target companies before the
final printing from other information contained in . . . documents” and “[w]ithout
disclosing his knowledge . . . purchased stock in the targets companies and sold the
shares immediately after takeover attempts were made public.” The Court reversed
Chiarella’s criminal conviction in the absence of a relationship that created a fiduciary
obligation). The Chiarella Court held:
Not every instance of financial unfairness constitutes fraudulent activity under §
10(b) . . . [t]he element required to make silence fraudulent—a duty to disclose—is
absent in this case. No duty could arise from . . . [the printer’s] relationship with the
sellers of the target company’s securities, for . . . [the printer] had no prior dealing
with them. He was not their agent, he was not a fiduciary, he was not a person in
whom the sellers had placed their trust and confidence. He was, in fact, a complete
stranger who dealt with the sellers only through impersonal market transactions.
When there is a relationship between the parties and not merely “impersonal market
transactions” but a degree of dependency, the law is expansive in order to create and
enforce fiduciary obligations.

Arnoff & Jacobs, supra note 107, at 4 (citing Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222
(1980)).
112. See Arnoff & Jacobs, supra note 107, at 3. Arnoff & Jacobs noted the
conspicuous absence of any discussion of fiduciary duty within the Goldstein opinion:
[T]he [Goldstein] court’s analysis is seriously flawed because it does not give
recognition to the fundamental proposition and wisdom that an investment manager
has fiduciary responsibility to the individual investor and his or her clientele because
the adviser-manager has care, custody, and control of the funds and securities of
others. The statement that “(i)f investors are owed a fiduciary duty and the entity is
also owed a fiduciary duty, the adviser will eventually face conflicts of interest” is
also too simplistic in that it does not allow for the distinction between voidable and
nonvoidable conflicts, as well as a proactive SEC that, inter alia, by reason of its
essential inspection process will learn enough of the current pitfalls of the practices
and procedures of investment adviser firms to be able by enlightened rule-making to
correct the problems [sic].

Id.
113. See id. at 6. Recent Tenth Circuit analysis differs greatly from that of the
Goldstein court in terms of the relevance of fiduciary duty considerations and the ability
of the SEC to regulate the U.S. capital markets:
[“A]n agent is a fiduciary with respect to matters within the scope of his agency.”
The firm, which had dual registration as a broker-dealer and an investment adviser,
failed to disclose the true facts and deceived clients that they were acting as a
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Hedge fund advisers receive the “highest degree of trust and
confidence in regard to the care, custody and control of other people’s
funds and securities.” 114 An adviser owes its investors a fiduciary duty,
and if an adviser, for example, participates in an activity known as
“scalping,” 115 it breaches that duty owed to its investors. 116
Accordingly, the Investment Company Act specifically contemplated
and imposed fiduciary duties upon advisers that are owed to both the
investment company and its investors. 117 The Supreme Court has also
contemplated the fiduciary duties owed to investors and customers in the
context of whether an investment account or the investment of capital is
deemed to be on a discretionary or non-discretionary basis. 118 There can
principal and the differential between the client’s price on a principal versus an
agency trade. The firm held itself out to its clients as a fiduciary and was held to that
standard. Most significantly, for this analysis and the conclusions to be drawn, is that
there were serious record-keeping deficiencies . . . [that] detrimentally affected
the . . . [SEC’s] ability to assemble the requisite evidence in . . . [the] case.

Id. (quoting the “functional analysis” in German v. SEC, 334 F.3d 1183 (10th Cir.
2003)).
114. Id. at 3.
115. Id. (citing SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963)).
Form may have prevailed over function in terms of the parsing of “client” without a
detailed analysis of fiduciary duty:
The U.S. Supreme Court has addressed fiduciary duty issues in the investment adviser
context. In SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc. et al., a registered investment
adviser engaged in the practice of purchasing shares of a security for his account
before he placed the trades for his clients. He did not disclose these transactions or
practices to his clients and, nonetheless, recommended the security for long-term
investment for the client while immediately reselling for a profit on a market upswing.
This practice has come to be known as “scalping” and the antithesis of the legislative
intent of the Investment Adviser Act of 1940.

Id. (emphasis added).
116. See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963)
(explaining that scalping is a mechanism for fraud or deceit upon any client or
prospective client within the meaning of the Investment Advisors Act).
117. See Advisers Act, supra note 14.
118. Cf. De Kwiatkowski v. Bear Stearns, 306 F.3d 1293 (2d Cir. 2002) (stating no
fiduciary duty owed to brokerage client for advice where client holds a nondiscretionary account with broker); see Arnoff & Jacobs, supra note 107 (“[T]he core
element of fiduciary duty is not the closest degree of privity but the dependency of
client-investors upon a relationship of trust and confidence that may have been created
by other contracting parties.”). The Second Circuit’s analysis of a client dependent
upon a broker managing a discretionary account was apparently not addressed by the
Goldstein court:
The transformative “special circumstances” recognized in the cases are circumstances
that render the client dependent—a client who has impaired faculties, or one who has
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be little debate that a hedge fund adviser has full investment discretion
over the capital under management and owes its investors fiduciary
duties.
The Goldstein court almost effortlessly dispensed with (or at least
profoundly discounted) the core concept of fiduciary duty in its analysis.
The court did, however, consider conflicts of interest as part of its
analysis and compared the hedge fund adviser-investor relationship with
the relationship of an issuer’s attorney and its common shareholders and
stated, “if the investors are owed a fiduciary duty and the entity is also
owed a fiduciary duty, then the adviser will inevitably face conflicts of
interest.” 119 The Goldstein court apparently did not, however, evaluate
the more relevant and analogous relationship between a common
shareholder and an issuer company’s officers and directors. As
management of an issuer company, officers and directors are
functionally equivalent to a hedge fund manager-adviser as it relates to
the fund’s investors, and owe similar fiduciary duties to the issuer’s
shareholders, concurrent with fiduciary duties owed to the company,
despite scenarios where conflicts of interest might arise. 120
There can be little doubt that when an investor provides capital to
Phillip Goldstein for investment in one of his “Bulldog Investors” hedge
funds, Mr. Goldstein is implicitly (and perhaps expressly by contract)
empowered with the discretion to invest that capital; to launch his many
proxy battles as part of some perceived “value investing” theorem; and

a closer than arm’s-length relationship with the broker, or one who is so lacking in
sophistication that de facto control of the account is deemed to rest in the broker. The
law thus imposes additional extra-contractual duties, on brokers who can take unfair
advantage of their customers’ incapacity or simplicity . . . . [In] absence of an express
advisory contract, there is no fiduciary duty on the part of . . . [the] broker dealer
“unless the customer is infirm or ignorant of business affairs.”

See Arnoff & Jacobs, supra note 107.
119. See Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 881 (D.C. Cir. 2006). The court
addressed conflicts in the context of an issuer’s outside “gatekeepers,” but not those
inherent in managerial relations between directors, issues and shareholders.
Consider an investment adviser to a hedge fund that is about to go bankrupt. His
advice to the fund will likely include any and all measures to remain solvent. His
advice to an investor in the fund, however, would likely be to sell. For the same
reason, we do not ordinarily deem the shareholders in a corporation the “clients” of
the corporation’s lawyers or accountants.

Id.
120. U.S. v. Brown, 459 F.3d 509, 533 (5th Cir. 2006) (Reavley, J., dissenting)
(“Enron executives are not Enron itself and, in any event, they owed a fiduciary duty to
Enron and its shareholders.”) (emphasis in original).
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to even install his “Bulldog” confederates on whatever corporate boards
he has successfully infiltrated through his funds’ investments. 121 Mr.
121. See RMR Hospitality and Real Estate Fund Form 8-K, Nov. 13, 2006,
Commission File No. 811-21502, http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1278038/
000110465906076852/a06-23938_48k.htm#scotch (last visited Dec. 1, 2006) (stating
allegations pursued by RMR is a closed end mutual fund and a registered investment
company against Bulldog for violations of share ownership limitation and its trust
agreement); RMR Ex. 99.1 to Nov. 13, 2006 8K, at 1, http://www.sec.gov
/Archives/edgar/data/1278038/0001104659060 76852/a06-23938_4ex99d1.htm (last
visited Dec. 1, 2006); RMR Ex.99.1 (to Nov. 13, 2006 8K), Compl. at 2 (stating
Bulldog’s practices of putting pressure on management after acquiring a significant
percentage of ownership, abandoning the company in a weak state and often threatens
expensive litigation) [hereinafter RHR Complaint]; Proxy Statement of Bulldog
Investors General Partnership and Karpus Management Stockholders of Seligman
Quality Municipal Fund, Inc., DEFC14A, Sept. 26, 2006, http://www.sec.gov
/Archives/edgar/data/862813/000136477306000010/sqfdefproxy.txt (last visited Dec. 8,
2006) (explaining a proposal by “Bulldog” to submit for a new slate of board of
directors); Definitive Proxy Statement Relating to Merger or Acquisition [sic], filed by
Hector Communications Corp., DEFM14A, Sept. 1, 2006, http://www.sec.gov/
Archives/edgar/data/863437/000110465906059347/a06-17435_1de
fm14a.htm#BackgroundOfTheMerger_010243 (last visited Dec. 3, 2006) (stating that
Goldstein threatened to conduct a proxy contest for a new board of directors); Angela
Pruitt, Activist Presses Closed-End Funds—Goldstein Wants Boards To Reconcile
Discounts With Net Asset Values, WALL ST. J., Apr. 5, 2005. Numerous issues have
been the target of Mr. Goldstein’s proxy attacks, including the First Israel Fund, which
successfully fended off his “activism”:
Last month First Israel Fund thwarted an attack from Mr. Goldstein by nominating
him to a seat on its board. Emerging Markets Telecommunications Fund also elected
Mr. Goldstein to its board after he raised concerns about the fund’s discount and
valuation of its investments.
“While I’m a good investor, I’m really a better shareholder activist,” said Mr.
Goldstein, who was an individual investor for many years before he began managing
money professionally 13 years ago.
Mr. Goldstein has a go-for-the-jugular style. In a Securities and Exchange
Commission filing in February, he likened New Germany Fund’s board to the
deposed Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein, arguing the fund was “disenfranchising”
shareholders.
Robert Wadsworth, a director of New Germany Fund, said Mr. Goldstein looks out
only for his self-interest and not other stockholders. “He is an arbitrageur,” he said.
“The problem is that, if you’re a member of the fund board, you have to figure out
what all of the shareholders want,” Mr. Wadsworth said. “I try to focus on the
interests of the long-term shareholders, not just those [like Mr. Goldstein] who are
trying to get in and out and make a quick buck.”

Id.; cf., Millennium Media Consulting: Highlights From Fall 2006 Market Outlook &
Investment Press Briefing, MARKET WIRE (Press Release), Oct. 31, 2006, available at
http://www.marketwire.com/mw/ release_html_b1?release_id=178864 (last visited Dec.
3, 2006). Mr. Goldstein commented that:
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Goldstein publicly acknowledged that he owes fiduciary duties to his
investors, but not surprisingly, just as the term “hedge fund” is not
mentioned anywhere in the federal securities laws, the core concept of
fiduciary duty was altogether absent from the Goldstein petitioners’
pleadings. 122 One can only surmise why a unanimous circuit court did
not evaluate the issue of fiduciary duty in the hedge fund context,
especially when the regulatory stakes were so high. Perhaps it was so
persuaded by the inconsistencies of the SEC’s past interpretation of the
word “client,” that it viewed further analysis to be unnecessary.

The typical value investor will buy a stock for 50% of its intrinsic value and wait for a
catalyst. Trouble is, some stocks are still cheap 10 years later . . . . Maximizing
shareholder value can take awhile, but it shouldn’t take forever. I believe a corporate
director has a fiduciary responsibility to do something if a stock trades at a persistent
discount to its intrinsic value.

Id.
122. See generally Goldstein Complaint, supra note 15 (providing no reference to
fiduciary duty). But see Lori Pizzani, Hedge Fund to Challenge SEC, Again: Denial of
13f Regulatory Exemption to Prompt New Lawsuit, MONEY MGMT. EXECUTIVE, Sept.
18, 2006, available at http://www.accessmylibrary.com/comsite5/bin/comsite5.pl?
page=library&item_id=0286-17695792 (last visited Dec. 3, 2006) (quoting Phillip
Goldstein) (“Just as we [as activist shareholders] don’t tolerate management abusing
shareholders, I don’t think any citizen should tolerate a Federal agency abusing its
authority. We have good investment ideas, and we don’t want them publicly out there.
I have a fiduciary responsibility to [my] investors.”); Millennium Media Consulting:
Highlights From Fall 2006 Market Outlook & Investment Press Briefing, MARKET
WIRE, Oct. 31, 2006, available at http://www.marketwire.com/mw/release_html_b1
?release_id=178864 (last visited Dec. 3, 2006).
Mr. Goldstein has publicly
acknowledged the importance of fiduciary duty with respect to the management of his
hedge funds:
Acting within your fiduciary duty often means pressing for the sale of a company in
order to maximize shareholder value, fighting to open-end a closed-end fund trading
at a persistent discount or even challenging securities regulators when a rule makes no
sense, said shareholder activist and hedge fund manager Phillip Goldstein, partner
with Saddle Brook, N.J.-based Bulldog Investors.

Id.; Angela Pruitt, Activist Presses Closed-End Funds—Goldstein Wants Boards To
Reconcile Discounts With Net Asset, WALL ST. J., April 5, 2005. The article stated that:
Mr. Goldstein doesn’t deny that making money is his ultimate goal, but he says his
activism helps shareholders. “It’s true that I have an interest and fiduciary duty to my
own investors to try to make them money,” said Mr. Goldstein. “If I can do that in an
honest, ethical way by being an activist, I think I should do that.”

Id.
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B. The Commission’s Stated Bases for Adoption of the Registration Rule
The SEC specifically noted that it adopted the Rule, “in response to
(i) a dramatic growth in hedge funds and the impact on markets of
trading by hedge fund advisers, (ii) an increase in fraud involving hedge
fund advisers, and (iii) the broader exposure of smaller non-traditional
hedge fund investors to the risks of hedge fund investing.” 123 Not
surprisingly, the Goldstein petitioners took almost mocking issue with
each of the SEC’s stated reasons, and suggested the bases were nonstarters or even dubious for lack of any proffered evidence by the
SEC. 124 The Goldstein petitioners also relied heavily on the 1999
President’s Working Group Report (“PWG”) 125 to refute the SEC’s cited
rationale. The petitioners failed to acknowledge, however, that the
primary focus of the PWG was the international banking system, 126 and
that the PWG “was not entrusted with protecting investors or the
securities markets, [or that] much has changed in the hedge fund

123. See SEC’s Appell. Brief, supra note 5, at 4-5. The SEC contended that its
regulatory framework was a benign measure that merely closed a loophole:
The rule and rule amendments close a “loophole,” which has arisen under the
Commission’s [1985] safe harbor, allowing hedge fund advisers to avoid registration
in situations where the assets of hedge fund investors are managed similarly (or in
many instances identically) to the manner in which a registered adviser manages the
assets of clients who directly open accounts with the adviser. . . . Not only do the rule
and rule amendments close this loophole but they do so . . . without imposing burdens
on the legitimate investment activities of hedge funds.

Id. (emphasis in original). The SEC also noted in its brief that, “some hedge funds may
offer investors different levels of access to risk and portfolio information, different
lock-up periods, and different fee amounts,” and found evidence of “side pocket”
arrangements, in which a particular set of assets is segregated to provide different
investors with distinct investment experiences. Id. at 43-44 (citing Carrick Mollencamp
and David Reilly, Tracking the Numbers/Street Sleuth: Some Big Investors Get to Use
the Side Door – During Hedge Fund Boom, Not Everyone Is Equal, WALL ST. J., Mar.
14, 2005, p. C1) (citing the “widespread existence of ‘side letters’ in the [hedge fund]
industry”).
124. See Goldstein Complaint, supra note 15, at ¶ 34 (stating that there was a lack of
evidence of fraud in hedge funds in the industry).
125. See generally Report of the President’s Working Group (“PWG”) on Financial
Markets, Hedge Funds, Leverage, and the Lessons of Long-Term Capital Management,
Apr. 1999, available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/hedgfund.pdf (last
visited April 24, 2007).
126. See SEC’s Appell. Brief, supra note 5, at 18 (stating that the Working Group
was not entrusted with protecting investors or the securities markets).
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industry and the market impact of hedge fund advisers since 1999.” 127
1. Future Seismic Shifts and Financial System Fissures
The Goldstein court observed that “the current push” for a revised
hedge fund regulatory regime finds “its origins in the failure of LongTerm Capital Management [“LTCM”], a Greenwich, Connecticut-based
fund that had more than $125 billion in assets under management at its
peak. In late 1998, the LTCM fund nearly collapsed.” 128 Certainly one
could appreciate that the unexpected implosion of one of the world’s
largest private capital pools might be a matter of grave concern.
Nonetheless, the court further observed that with regard to the LTCM
debacle, “[a]lmost all of the country’s major financial institutions were
put at risk due to their credit exposure to Long-Term, and the president
of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York personally intervened to
engineer a bailout of the fund in order to avoid a national financial
crisis.” 129 While it is highly unlikely that the prophylactic registration
requirements of the so-called “Hedge Fund Rule” could have prevented
“a group of elite investors who . . . believed they could beat the market
and like alchemists, create limitless wealth for themselves and their
partners, [who] in fact created a trillion-dollar hole in the international
banking system,” 130 the risk of systemic damage from a major hedge
collapse may still lurk beneath the market’s surface today. Moreover, to
consciously ignore such potential systemic and catastrophic financial
risk might be perceived as something akin to the mythical Major T. J.
“King” Kong’s fateful cinematic fall from the sky. 131

127. See id. at 18, 48 (“[T]he Commission [wa]s the only member of the [1999
President’s] Working Group entrusted with the role of protecting investors and
overseeing the nation’s securities markets.”).
128. See Goldstein v. SEC 451 F.3d 873, 877 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
129. Id. (citing ROGER LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIUS FAILED: THE RISE AND FALL OF
LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT – HOW ONE SMALL BANK CREATED A TRILLIONDOLLAR HOLE (Hardback ed. 2001)).
130. LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIUS FAILED (Paperback ed. 2002); see Evan-Pritchard,
supra note 35; see also, e.g., Jody Shenn and Yalman Onaran, Bear Stearns Plans $3.2
Billion Hedge Fund Bailout (Update4), REUTERS, June 22, 2007, available at
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=amZ.IeL2pJHo&refer=ho
me (last visited June 25, 2007). (“Bear Stearns Cos. offered $3.2 billion in loans to bail
out one of its failing hedge funds, the biggest rescue since 1998, after creditors started
seizing assets and investors demanded their money back.”).
131. DR. STRANGELOVE, OR: HOW I LEARNED TO STOP WORRYING AND LOVE THE
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2. Proliferation of Hedge Frauds
The Goldstein pleadings scoffed at the amount of securities fraud
that has been discovered in the last decade with alleged connections to
hedge fund trading activities, and rationalized that any degree of hedge
fund fraud is proportionate and therefore requires no prophylactic
regulatory measures. 132 The Goldstein camp sought to marginalize this
issue by pointing to the existing anti-fraud provisions of the Advisers
Act, which largely addresses fraud retrospectively. 133 It also called
attention to the absence of any proffered evidence of hedge fraud in the
Rule’s Proposing Release, and cited the PWG report for support that
there was no evidence indicating that hedge funds or their advisers
engage disproportionately in fraudulent activity. 134 The Goldstein
petitioners, however, cited no support whatsoever for the implied
premise that the SEC was somehow required to proffer evidence as a
prerequisite to its adoption of the Rule.
Mr. Goldstein’s theory also seemingly shrugged off scores of recent
enforcement actions brought by the SEC against hedge funds, alleging
an array of fraudulent activities. 135 There can be little doubt that hedge
BOMB (Columbia Pictures 1964), available at http://www.filmsite.org/drst.html (last
visited Dec. 2, 2006).
132. See Goldstein Complaint, supra note 15, at ¶ 34 (emphasis added).
133. See id.
134. See id. (emphasis added).
135. See, e.g., In re Banc One Inv. Advisors Corp., Advisers Act Release No. 2254
(June 29, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/ia-2254.htm (last
visited Feb. 25, 2007) [hereinafter Market Timing] (Commission found that investment
adviser permitted Canary hedge fund manager Edward Stern to time the adviser’s
mutual funds, contrary to the funds’ prospectuses; helped arrange financing for the
timing trades; failed to disclose the timing arrangements; and provided Stern with
nonpublic portfolio information); see Investment Adviser Registration Final Rule, supra
note 45, at 72,057 n.29; see SEC press release, SEC Announces $38 Million Fair Fund
Distribution in the Veras Hedge Funds Settlement, Mar. 21, 2007, available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-50.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2007); SEC v.
Sec. Trust Co., N.A., Litigation Release No. 18,653 (Apr. 1, 2004) [hereinafter Late
Trading] (consent to judgment by trust company charged with facilitating late trades
and market timing by affiliated hedge funds over at least a three-year period), available
at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr18653.htm (Mar. 26, 2007); Securities and
Exchange Commission v. Michael Lauer, Case No. 03-80612-CIV-ZLOCH (S.D. Fla.,
filed July 8, 2003) [hereinafter Market Manipulation] (“Specifically, the Complaint
alleges that the defendants systematically manipulated the month end closing prices of
certain securities held by the Funds to overstate the value of the Funds’ holdings in
virtually worthless companies.”); SEC Litigation Release No. 18,247, July 23, 2003,
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fraud exists every trading day, in a wide variety of schemes, including
market timing, late trading, insider trading, abusive short sales, market
manipulation, and a host of other deceptive (and illegal) practices. 136
The question of whether adviser registration can predict or prevent any
of these activities is certainly fair, but at a minimum, it seems reasonable
to conclude that the overall regulatory regime contemplated by the
vacated Rule did reduce the frequency and scope of such misconduct, or
at least increase the likelihood of detection. 137
Reported hedge fund related fraud has been a growing source of
concern for securities regulators. Alleged fraudulent trading by hedge
funds reportedly constitutes roughly eleven percent of all recent SEC

available at http://sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr18247.htm (last visited Dec. 4, 2006);
see also Paul Tharp, Senate Raises Heat on Funds in Panel Grilling, N.Y. POST, Dec. 6,
2006, available at http://www.nypost.com/seven/12062006/business/senate_raises_heat
_on_funds_in_panel_grilling_business_paul_tharp.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2007)
(“Wall Street is stacked tighter than ever against the little guy because secret investment
pools that operate freely outside securities laws can actually rig stock trading, according
to Senate testimony.”); Jenny Anderson, Hedge Funds Draw Insider Scrutiny, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 16, 2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/16/business/
16hedge.html; Alex Brummer, Discipline for a false market, DAILYMAIL (U.K.), Mar.
30, 2007, available at http://www.thisismoney.co.uk/news/columnists/article.html?
in_article_id=418948&in_page_id=19&in_author_id=1 (last visited Mar. 30, 2007)
(“We know from the FSA’s [the U.K. Financial Services Authority] survey released
earlier this month that in 2005 almost a quarter of announced deals were preceded by
insider trading.”) (emphasis added); Katherine Burton and David Scheer, Sandell Asset
Management Draws SEC Scrutiny for Short Sales, BLOOMBERG.COM, Oct. 31, 2006,
available at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20670001&refer=funds&sid=a
JoinHyJ.iyQ (last visited Feb. 25, 2007).
136. Id.
137. For example, the SEC examination powers and the books and records
provisions within the Rule certainly appeared to have the potential to serve as effective
measures to uncover fraudulent activity, and the prospect of an SEC inspection seems to
intuitively establish a strong deterrent for the avoidance of misconduct. But see speech,
supra note 35. Commissioner Atkins remarked that it is “wishful thinking” to believe
the Rule would have effectively detected hedge funds engaging in securities fraud:
Needless to say, we did not find the late trading and market timing problems through
our examinations of any of the many registered funds, registered advisors, and
registered broker-dealers that were at fault. And, those who claim that hedge fund
registration would have led us to discover the fraud through examination are engaging
in wishful thinking. They don’t understand the craftiness of people who engage in
illicit activities. As we do now, we will have to rely heavily on disgruntled investors,
former employees, and suspicious third parties, such as a prime broker, to alert us to
problems.

Id.
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insider trading enforcement actions, a figure that does not include frauds
already perpetrated but still under investigation, nor those that have
eluded detection. 138 The SEC enforcement data arguably suggests a
disproportionate degree of hedge fund fraud exists that potentially casts
a menacing shadow. 139 Recently reported Senate Committee testimony
asserted that “hedge funds routinely break securities laws and can harm
smaller investors with massive insider trading that blindsides and wrecks
ordinary investors.” 140 Even if Mr. Goldstein’s theory of proportional
fraud was valid, it does not adequately explain why such a large
component of the U.S. capital markets should be permitted to operate so
furtively, or how that is in any way consistent with the philosophy of
full disclosure.
3. Red Ink Risks For Retail Investors
Among the significant changes in the recent hedge fund landscape
has been the increasing trend of hedge fund “retailization.” 141 The
Goldstein pleadings rebutted the findings of “retailization” in the 2003
SEC Staff Report 142 based upon the 1999 PWG findings. 143
138. Jesse Westbrook and Otis Bildeau, U.S. Insider Trading Bill Takes Aim At
Hedge Funds, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Nov. 23, 2006, http://www.iht.com/articles/
2006/11/23/business/hedge.php (last visited Jan 31, 2007) (“Lawsuits involving hedge
funds made up 11 percent of the SEC’s insider trading cases in fiscal 2006, according to
agency figures.”).
139. See SEC’s Appell. Brief, supra note 5, at 47-48 n.1 (“[T]he Commission found
that things had changed since the Working Group’s report was issued in 1999: ‘the size
of the hedge fund industry has doubled, the exposure of investors to hedge funds has
broadened, and the incidence of fraud we discover involving hedge fund advisers has
increased.’”).
140. Paul Tharp, Senate Raises Heat on Funds in Panel Grilling, supra note 135
(emphasis added) (“Witnesses at a Senate panel took turns yesterday bashing the
expanding reach of hedge funds, which now control a third of Wall Street’s trading
action and wield more than $1.3 trillion of other people’s money—mostly cash from
well-to-do individuals and big pension funds trying to keep retirement checks
flowing.”).
141. 2003 SEC Staff Report, supra note 23.
142. Id.
143. See Goldstein Complaint, supra note 15, at ¶ 34. The Goldstein petitioners
sought to marginalize each and every reason the SEC asserted for its promulgation of
the Rule, repeatedly referring to the 1999 PWG report:
Notwithstanding “concerns” expressed in the report about fraud and “retailization” of
hedge funds (i.e., investment in hedge funds by significant numbers of less
sophisticated investors), the report concluded that (i) there was no evidence that fraud
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Nonetheless, evidence of hedge fund “retailization” has continued to
mount. For instance, one of the more glaring recent examples is the
nine-figure losses suffered by retirement beneficiaries of the San Diego
county employees pension fund, directly attributable to its ill-fated
Amaranth investment. 144 Mr. Goldstein posited, perhaps at the height of
sophistry, that pension funds are all somehow “sophisticated
investors.” 145 The unfortunate reality, despite the incredulous Goldstein
rhetoric, is that the real Amaranth risk exposure was incurred by the
retirement fund’s beneficiaries—municipal employees such as former
public school teachers, police officers, firefighters, parks and recreation
employees, trash collectors, municipal parking lot attendants, and other
local government retirees who are entirely antithetical to the concept of
the so-called “sophisticated investor.” 146
San Diego pension fund administrators have since fired the
consultant who recommended investing in Amaranth’s fund, 147 and
was disproportionately committed by or in hedge funds that unregistered advisers
managed, (ii) the observed growth in hedge funds was fueled by increasing numbers
of sophisticated investors such as pension funds, and (iii) there was no evidence of
“retailization” in the industry.

Id.
144. See, e.g., Christopher S. Rugaber, Senator Urges Hedge Fund Transparency,
CHRONICLE
(AP),
Oct.
18,
2006,
available
at
HOUSTON
http://www.chron.com/cs/CDA/printstory.mpl/ap/fn/4268516 (last visited Oct. 18,
2006).
[Senator Charles] Grassley (R-Iowa) said in the letter that “tens of millions of
Americans may be unwittingly exposed to hedge fund investments” through public
and private pension plans that invest in hedge funds. As a result, significant future
losses at hedge funds could put many workers’ retirement security at risk, Grassley
wrote, and could cause losses at the federal pension insurance agency, the Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corp.

Id. See Jennifer McCandless, Pension Fund to Replace Advisor Post-Amaranth,
FINANCIAL NEWS (UK), Oct. 24, 2006, available at http://www.financialnewsus.com/?page=ushome&contentid=1045677634 (last visited Mar. 26, 2007) (“The San
Diego County Employees Retirement Association, the Californian pension plan, is
looking to replace the investment consultancy that recommended it put money in
Amaranth Advisors, a move which lost the fund more than $100m (€79.6m).”).
145. See Goldstein Complaint, supra note 15, at ¶ 41.
146. Id.
147. Sam Hodgson, SDCERA parts ways with consultant who recommended
Oct.
23,
2006,
available
at
Amaranth, THE DAILY TRANSCRIPT,
http://www.sddt.com/News/article.cfm?SourceCode=20061023czf (“The San Diego
County Employees Retirement Association has parted ways with the consultant who
recommended purchasing $175 million worth of shares in Amaranth—an investment
that is now worth an estimated $70 million.”).
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retained a high profile securities litigation firm in an attempt to recover
at least a portion of the pension fund’s reported nine-figure Amaranth
losses. 148 Meanwhile, a massive hedge fund management firm that
“help[ed in the] winding down of [Amaranth’s] investment portfolio”
completed an initial public offering on February 9, 2007, and the private
equity firm, Blackstone Group, L.P., went public on June 21, 2007,
despite bipartisan protests from ranking legislators to postpone the $4B
NYSE offering while Congress conducted hearings into the matter. 149
Meanwhile, as financial market and media attention was still focused on
the Blackstone IPO, shares of Freedom Acquisition Holdings Corp., a
little-known AMEX-listed special purpose acquisition corporation
(“SPAC”), had inexplicably surged on aberrant volume in a declining
broader market, and on June 25, 2007, a $3.4B reverse acquisition
involving GLG Partners was revealed, which prompted at least one
commentator to question the “flagrantly suspicious trading ahead of the
announcement regarding the “regulatory-challenged London-based
hedge fund.” 150 These and other recent market developments certainly
148. Michael Herman, U.S. Fund Hires Lawyers To Prepare Amaranth Case, TIMES
ONLINE (UK), Oct. 23, 2006, available at http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/
law/corporate/article610330.ece (last visited Feb. 24, 2007).
149. See Lynn Cowan, Fortress Registers for First U.S. IPO of Hedge Fund, WALL
ST. J., Nov. 9, 2006, available at http://online.wsj.com/article_print/SB116308
559523818612.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2006). Fortress, now trading under the ticker
symbol “FIG,” completed the first ever U.S. “IPO” of a hedge fund adviser:
The company [Fortress Investment Group, LLC], which has $26 billion in assets
under management, offers the public a rare opportunity to own an alternative
investment manager and benefit from its hefty management fees through dividends.
As an alternative asset manager, Fortress raises and manages private-equity funds and
hedge funds . . . .

Id.; see also William Hutchings, Fortress advises on Amaranth liquidation,
FINANCIALNEWS, Oct. 2, 2006, available at http://www.financialnewsus.com/?contentid=1045568680 (last visited Nov. 14, 2006); Michael J. de la Merced,
Fortress Goes Public, a First for Hedge Funds Inside U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2007,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/09/business/09hedge.html (last visited
Feb. 9, 2007). Rachelle Younglai, SEC clears Blackstone IPO despite lawmakers' plea,
Reuters, June 21, 2007, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/politicsNews/
idUSN2139935620070621 (last visited June 24, 2007).
A last-minute plea from [Henry Waxman] a senior U.S. House of Representatives
Democrat to delay Blackstone Group LP’s initial public offering was rejected by U.S.
regulators on Thursday, and the IPO went ahead, eagerly grabbed up by hungry
investors. In making its decision, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission said
it “rigorously applied” U.S. laws in reviewing the offering. . . . Waxman was the fifth
chairman of a congressional committee to express concerns or raise questions about
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suggest that the trend towards hedge fund “retailization” is undeniable,
and it may someday soon collide with the Second Circuit’s “special
circumstances” doctrine first articulated in De Kwiatkowsi. 151
the Blackstone IPO during the past week.

Id.
150. See Freedom Acquisition Holdings, Inc., Press Release, GLG Partners to
Access Public Markets Through Reverse Acquisition, June 25, 2007, available at
http://www.amex.com/?href=/equities/listCmp/EqLCCmpNews.jsp?Product_Symbol=F
RH&listedYear=2007 (last visited June 25, 2007).
The British hedge fund
characterized its reverse “SPAC” acquisition as “a Key Strategic Step in Building
GLG’s Global Business,” and revealed its expectations of an eventual NYSE listing:
The combined company will be named GLG Partners, Inc. Shares of the
combined company are expected to trade on the New York Stock Exchange under the
ticker symbol ‘GLG’ upon consummation of the transaction. GLG will also explore
the merits of a dual listing in Europe. Based on the closing price of Freedom's shares
on Friday, June 22, 2007, Freedom’s shareholders will own approximately 28 percent
and current GLG equity holders will own approximately 72 percent of the combined
company's shares on a fully diluted basis.

Id. See also, Greg Newton, Somebody Blabbed: Freedom Shares Jumped 8% Friday
Ahead of GLG Reverse Acquisition, SEEKINGALPHA.COM, June 25, 2007, available at
http://financial.seekingalpha.com/article/39308 (last visited June 25, 2007). The snarky
market pundit questioned the suspicious surge in Freedom Acquisition Holdings that
occurred just one trading day before GLG’s reverse SPAC acquisition announcement:
GLG, the hugely successful—$20 billion in assets—but regulatory-challenged
London-based hedge fund, will slip through the backdoor to list on the New York
Stock Exchange. Funnily enough, the shares of its reverse takeover vehicle, the
Amex-listed SPAC (special purpose acquisition company) Freedom Acquisition
Holdings Corp (FRH), magically gained more than 8 percent Friday, on almost 10
times their average volume, mostly late in the day when the major indexes were
heading off a cliff. . . .
The flagrantly suspicious trading in FRH Friday is ironic, or perhaps even iconic.
GLG was sanctioned by British regulators last year, and French regulators last week,
for separate incidents of what boiled down to insider trading; GLG plans appealing
the French ruling.

Id. See also, Henny Sender and Alistair MacDonald, GLG Partners
Two-Stepping To U.S. Listing, WALL ST. J., June 25, 2007, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB118273321096046620.html (last visited June 25,
2007) (“GLG is avoiding the hassles of an initial public offering by selling a stake
in itself to a company that is already publicly traded. . . . A public listing is a big
step for GLG, which has a somewhat checkered past.”); Alexander Ferguson, GLG
Partners to float on New York Stock Exchange via reverse takeover, FORBES (via
THOMSON/AFX NEWS), June 25, 2007, available http://www.forbes.com/markets
/feeds/afx/2007/06/25/afx3852586.html (last visited June 25, 2007).
151. For example, Goldman Sachs also recently introduced a synthetic derivative
securities product (coined the “Absolute Return Tracker”) that apparently “seeks to
replicate” hedge fund exposure without any minimum investment requirements or
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IV. THE GOLDSTEIN AFTERMATH, AMARANTH, AND THE
SEC’S SLOW AND STEADY RESPONSE
While the SEC has used the media to press its agenda of expanded
hedge fund regulation following the Goldstein aftermath, 152 the
Commission now appears to have adopted a slower and more cautious
gait on this path, allowing “more time to review their language.” As its
cautious deliberations continue, the SEC has not yet reached any
conclusive determinations regarding the future regulatory framework for
this $2 trillion market sector, but did propose a substantive anti-fraud
Rule at the end of 2006. 153

pesky “accredited investor” thresholds. See Goldman Plays Down Tracker Challenge
Dec.
8,
2006,
available
at
To
Hedge
Funds,
HEDGEWEEK.COM,
http://www.hedgeweek.com/articles/detail.jsp?content_id =42044 (last visited Jan. 31,
2007). Goldman-Sachs has developed a securities product that seeks to mimic hedge
fund performance, that is readily available to overseas retail investors:
Despite announcing the launch of a tracker product that seeks to replicate the returns
of hedge fund strategies at the cost to the investor of an index product, Goldman
Sachs is playing down suggestions that the product could eat into the market for funds
of hedge funds by delivering similar performance at a much lower price.
The Absolute Return Tracker uses hedge fund investment data delivered by a thirdparty provider with a one-month lag to determine the aggregate positions of hedge
funds in a basket of asset classes and to replicate their net exposure to equities,
commodities, fixed income, credit and volatility through derivatives and other
investments. The ART index is already available to retail investors in Italy through a
tie-up with a bank there and it is likely to be rolled out in other markets in the new
year.

Id. See De Kwiatkowski, supra note 118 (discussing the De Kwiatkowski court’s
development of the “special circumstances” doctrine in the context of a “dependent”
client and the duties owed to that client by a broker).
152. See, e.g., Roddy Boyd, We Will Follow the Money: SEC, N.Y. POST, Nov. 14,
2006, available at http://www.nypost.com/seven/11142006/business/we_will_follow_
the_money__sec_business_roddy_boyd.htm (last visited Dec. 5, 2006).
153. S.E.C. Delays Weighing Hedge Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2006, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/02/business/02hedge.html?_r=1&dlbk&oref=slogin
(last visited Dec. 5, 2006). The SEC has apparently adopted a more circumspect
approach to rule promulgation following the results of Goldstein:
The Securities and Exchange Commission on Friday dropped consideration of two
hedge fund measures from its agenda for a Monday meeting, saying it wanted more
time to review their language.
One measure dealt with the minimum net worth that an investor must have to be
allowed to invest in hedge funds. In September, the S.E.C. said it was preparing a
measure that would raise the minimum, known as the accredited investor standard,
amid concern that too many investors of limited means are putting money in hedge
funds.
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The other measure involves tightening the antifraud statute dealing with hedge
funds—lightly policed capital pools popular with the rich that have doubled their
assets under management to $1.3 trillion in the last five years. Both measures
emerged after a court in June struck down an agency regulation that required most
hedge fund advisers to register with the S.E.C. The court said the S.E.C. overstepped
its bounds in adopting the rule.
An S.E.C. spokesman said the agency wanted “another week to make sure the
technical language of the antifraud provision appropriately addresses the court’s
decision.” The S.E.C. has scheduled another public meeting for Dec. 13, when the
hedge fund measures could come up.

Id.; see Prohibition of Fraud by Advisers to Certain Pooled Investment Vehicles;
Accredited Investors in Certain Private Investment Vehicles (Proposed Rule - comment
period ended Mar. 9, 2007), 17 CFR §§ 230 and 275 (Dec. 27, 2006, SEC Release No.
33-8766; IA-2576; File No. S7-25-06), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/
2006/33-8766.pdf (last visited Jan. 21, 2007); see comment letter from Phillip Goldstein
to SEC, Mar. 3, 2007, available at http://sec.gov/comments/s7-25-06/pgoldstein
8435.pdf (last visited Mar. 28, 2007) (criticizing the anti-fraud provisions of the
Proposed Rule as “unnecessary” and characterizing the proposed increase in the
financial minimums for the definition of “accredited investor” as a “massive increase in
the minimum wealth an individual would need before that person could invest in a
hedge fund”). Mr. Goldstein also contended the Proposed Rule is “fatally flawed”
because it does not expressly include private equity funds within its ambit, and that “if
investor protection is the sole objective of the proposed rule (as it should be) then
excluding venture capital funds unquestionably renders the rule arbitrary and
capricious.” Id. Mr. Goldstein noted, however, that “we do not intend to challenge the
rule, because . . . we do not expect it to have a material effect on our business.” Id. Mr.
Goldstein also proposed a “blanket exemption” for any otherwise unqualified investor
who submits certain suggested waiver language. Id. See also Thomas John Holton,
Ephraim Lemberger and Michael Mavrides (Bingham-McCutchen, LLP), United
States: SEC Issues Proposed Rules Affecting Hedge Funds And Other Pooled
Investment Vehicles, 18 Jan. 2007, available at http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?
article_id=45566&lk=1 (last visited Jan. 21, 2007). The authors, Bingham-McCutchen
securities lawyers, noted certain details of the SEC’s proposal of a new anti-fraud rule
in late 2006:
On December 27, 2006, the Securities and Exchange Commission published two sets
of proposed new rules. Many pooled investment vehicles, including hedge funds,
venture capital funds, private equity funds, listed closed-end funds, and mutual funds,
will be affected by one or both sets of rule . . . . Proposed Rule 206(4)-8 under the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940, as amended (the “Advisers Act”), would prohibit
any investment adviser, whether or not registered, to a pooled investment vehicle from
making false or misleading statements to, or otherwise defrauding, investors or
prospective investors in the pooled investment vehicle . . . . Specifically, the proposed
rule would make it a fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative act, practice or course of
business for any investment adviser to a pooled investment vehicle to make any
untrue statement of a material fact to any investor or prospective investor in a pooled
investment vehicle or omit a material fact necessary to make statements made to such
investors, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading.
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The U.S. Federal Reserve, SEC, and IMF have all recognized the
reality that hedge fund trading activity often improves financial market
pricing efficiency and, in many instances, serves to increase liquidity.154
However, hedge funds are such an enormous component of the U.S.
commodities, futures and securities markets that the related trading
activities invariably affect counter-parties; overall macro (and micro)
market conditions; and a variety of other market participants, sometimes
with destructive (and illegal) results. Consequently, “[p]rosecutors
[have] said it’s impossible to fight the rampant Wild West mentality
among the hedge fund crowd unless new laws are enacted to tighten the
industry’s loose ways and wide loopholes.” 155 While the SEC adopted
an arguably flawed approach when promulgating the so-called “Hedge
Fund Rule,” there can be little debate that a multi-trillion dollar market
sector warrants some measure of regulatory oversight. Of course, the
“devil is in the details,” 156 and the pressing questions now are not if the
In addition, the proposed rule would prohibit any act or practice which defrauds
investors or prospective investors, regardless of whether such act or practice involves
statements.

Id. (emphasis in original).
154. Ubide, supra note 28; see also IMF’s United States: 2006 Article IV
Consultation—Staff Report; Staff Statement; and Public Information Notice on the
Executive Board Decision, July 2006, IMF Country Report No. 06/297, available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2006/cr06279.pdf (last visited Dec. 2, 2006)
(The increased activity of hedge funds had enhanced price discovery and liquidity in
many of the new markets. However, they agreed with the mission that some markets
had yet to be fully tested in a less benign financial environment). IMF Staff Report at
11; see also CNBC interview of former Goldman Sachs executive and current U.S.
Treasury Secretary Henry “Hank” Pauslon, Dec. 8, 2006, Paulson: Hedge Funds
‘Positive’ But Need to Be Monitored, CNBC.COM, Dec. 8, 2006, available at
http://www.cnbc.com/id/16109844 (last visited Dec. 8, 2006). Sec. Paulson stated that:
By and large, hedge funds (and derivatives) have been positive for the capital markets,
they have made them more efficient, more liquid, and it’s been very helpful in
dispersing risk, and I think that may be one of the reasons we haven’t had a financial
shock in the last eight years. But again, it’s very important that we look very carefully
at the nature of the market today.

Id.
155. See Tharp, supra note 135 (“Witnesses at a Senate panel took turns yesterday
bashing the expanding reach of hedge funds, which now control a third of Wall Street’s
trading action and wield more than $1.3 trillion of other peoples’ money - mostly cash
from well-to-do individuals and big pension funds trying to keep retirement checks
flowing.”) (emphasis added).
156. RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF POPULAR PROVERBS AND SAYINGS (1st ed.
1996) shows this phrase as a variation of “God is in the details - Whatever one does
should be done thoroughly; details are important.” The saying is generally attributed to
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SEC will regain some measure of regulatory oversight, but rather when
and how.
Congress took an initial step subsequent the Goldstein decision, but
no new legislation resulted from the proposal. The House of
Representatives Finance Committee Chairman for the 110th Congress,
Representative Barney Frank (Mass.), and three House co-sponsors, 157
introduced a Bill on the heels of the D.C. Circuit Court’s Goldstein
opinion 158 during the twilight of the 109th Congress. Although short on
details, it was potentially profound in its post-Goldstein regulatory
impact. The two-page Bill (H.R. 5712) titled, “The Securities and
Exchange Commission Authority Restoration Act of 2006,” sought “[t]o
amend the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 to authorize the
Commission to require the registration of hedge fund advisers under that
Act.” 159 If Congress had enacted H.R. 5712, the method of counting

Gustave Flaubert (1821-80), who is often quoted as saying, “Le bon Dieu est dans le
detail” (“God is in the details”); see BARTLETT’S FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS (16th ed.).
Other attributions include Michelangelo, the architect Ludwig Mies van der Rohe, and
the art historian Aby Warburg. “The Devil is in the details” is a variant of the proverb,
referring to a catch hidden in the details. “Governing is in the details” and “The truth, if
it exists, is in the details” are recent variants. Listed as an anonymous saying in the
16th edition of Bartlett’s “Familiar Quotations.” Id.
157. Rep. Michael Capuano (D-MA), Rep. Charles Gonzalez (D-TX), Rep. Paul
Kanjorski (D-PA) were co-sponsors of The Securities and Exchange Commission
Authority Restoration Act of 2006, H.R. 5712, 109th Cong. (2d Sess. 2006) [hereinafter
H.R. 5712].
158. H.R. 5712 was introduced on June 29, 2006, six days after the Goldstein
opinion was released.
159. See The Securities and Exchange Commission Authority Restoration Act of
2006, H.R. 5712, 109th Cong. (2d Sess. 2006). Representative Frank’s proposed bill
would have restored the SEC authority vacated by the Goldstein court:
SEC. 2. AUTHORITY TO LIMIT EXEMPTION.
Section 203 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. [§] 80b-3) is amended
by adding at the end the following new subsection:
(l) AUTHORITY TO LIMIT EXEMPTION. — (1) AUTHORITY.—The
Commission may, by rule or regulation, limit the availability of the exemption
provided by subsection (b)(3), and require the registration under this section, of an
investment adviser by requiring that certain shareholders, partners, and beneficial
owners of, or investors in, clients of the adviser shall also be counted as clients
themselves for purposes of such subsection, as the Commission determines necessary
in the public interest or for the protection of investors. (emphasis added).
(2) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—The treatment of a shareholder, partner,
beneficial owner, or investor as a client for purposes of registration under this section
shall not affect, and shall not be affected by, the treatment of such persons not as
clients for purposes of section 206 or any other section of this title.
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“clients” would have reverted to the method employed within the socalled “Hedge Fund Rule” and reversed the effect of the D.C. Circuit
Court’s Goldstein decision. Three weeks after the bill’s introduction,
H.R. 5712 was referred to the House Subcommittee on Capital Markets,
Insurance and Government Sponsored Enterprises, where it eventually
“died in committee.” 160 One month after the bill’s introduction, the
circuit court issued its formal Goldstein mandate, and the SEC opted to
not appeal the matter to the U.S. Supreme Court. 161
There was a trickle of investment adviser “de-registrations” after
the Rule was formally vacated, but the trend slowed dramatically, with
just ten percent of all affected investment advisers electing to remove
their registration as of January 2007. 162 Among the investment advisers
Id.
160. See H.R. 5712 status tracking, available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress
/bill.xpd?bill=h109-5712 (last visited Mar. 26, 2007) (“This bill is in the first stage of
the legislative process where the bill is considered in committee and may undergo
significant changes in markup sessions.”); Banking chairman wary of hedge fund
NEWS,
Feb.
6,
2007,
available
at
registration,
INVESTMENT
http://www.investmentnews.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20070206/FREE/7020503
0/-1/INRegulatoryAlert03 (last visited Feb. 15, 2007). The article points out that:
At a press conference held in early December [2006], Sen. Christopher Dodd, DConn., said that although he’s concerned about pension plan money that’s invested in
hedge funds, he does not see “rushing back” into legislation that would give the
Securities and Exchange Commission authority to require hedge funds to register with
the agency. A bill [H.R. 5712] introduced last year with that goal died in committee.

Id.
161. See Statement of Chairman Cox Concerning the Decision of the U.S. Court of
Appeals in Phillip Goldstein et al. v. SEC (Aug. 7, 2006), available at
http://sec.gov/news/press/2006/2006-135.htm (last visited Nov. 29, 2006); see also
Amanda Cantrell, SEC Faces Hedge Fund Deadline: The SEC has until Aug. 7 to
decide what to do in the wake of a court’s decision to overturn its hedge fund rule,
CNNMONEY.COM, Aug. 4, 2006, available at http://money.cnn.com/2006/08/04/
markets/hedge_returns/ (last visited Jan. 2, 2007).
162. More Hedge Funds Deregister After Ruling, AFX UK Focus (U.K.), September
27, 2006. Slightly more than one hundred advisers rescinded their Form ADV
registrations (out of a total exceeding 2,000):
From June 23 [2006], through Sept. 21 [2006], 116 advisers indicating they have
hedge funds as clients have withdrawn their registrations, said John Heine, a
spokesman for the SEC. Of those, about 76 indicated that they withdrew due to the
court decision overturning the regulatory push, he said. “Others withdrew for various
other reasons, including going out of business, [Heine] said.” And according to John
Heine, since the appeals court decision through Sept. 21, 2006, 34 hedge fund
advisers have registered with the SEC. As of September 21, 2006, there were a total
of 2,468 Investment Advisers who had indicated they have hedge funds as “clients”
registered with the SEC, according to the SEC’s Heine.
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who elected to not withdraw registration was CastleRock Management,
a Manhattan-based “buy and hold” bottom-up selection strategy long
equities hedge fund. 163 During a March 20, 2007 guest lecture at
Fordham University School of Law, CastleRock president Paul Tanico
advised Fordham students to, “[r]un the business down the middle of the
road and remember the lines. . . . . The SEC and IRS are not to be
messed with, . . . don’t run your business over the line, [or] shortcut for
something.” 164 Mr. Tanico also commented about the SEC registration
regime and his firm’s reasoning for not withdrawing its registration
Form ADV:
I don’t like regulation, and think rich people ought to be able to lose
money in hedge funds without registration—we are registered
though and we always run our business down the middle of the road
so it wasn’t a big deal and we didn’t de-register. . . . I think that a lot
of funds that are going down to the small investor where people have
no business [investing] in these funds, and with a lot of amateurs are
running it who lose money, so I think that aspect of . . . safeguarding
smaller investors with the rules was right. . . . I would hate to see
Congress interfere because of a few “bad apples” . . . so I come out

Id.; see also Hannah Glover, Most Hedge Funds Remain Registered: Prepare for SEC
Exams; Staying Squeaky Clean, MONEY MGMT. EXEC., Jan. 15, 2007, 2007 WLNR
871608, available at http://www.financial-planning.com/pubs/fpi/20070119101.html
(last visited Jan. 19, 2007). Only a slim minority of investment advisers elected to
withdraw their registration Forms ADV:
After the fight for the right to remain unregistered, only about 10% of those hedge
fund advisors that signed up with the Securities and Exchange Commission before last
year’s Feb. 1 [2006] deadline have opted to withdraw, according to data from the
federal regulator. The remaining 2,200 or so are readying for examinations.
The reason, industry watchers suggest, is that what was once characterized as the
“Wild West” of investment management has learned that registration has its
advantages, not the least of which is credibility, especially with deep-pocketed
institutional investors.

Id.
163. CastleRock Management (IARD/CRD No. 132155) Investment Adviser
registration Form ADV was timely filed in February 2005, available at
http://www.adviserinfo.sec.gov/IAPD/Content/Search/iapd_OrgSearch.aspx
(last
visited Mar. 25, 2007).
164. Videotape of Mr. Tanico’s remarks on file with Fordham University School of
Law’s Center for Corporate Securities and Financial Law, Prof. Ann R. Rakoff,
Executive Director, 140 W. 62nd St., Room 443, New York, NY 10023; telephone
(212) 636-7985; e-mail: corporatecenter@law.fordham.edu.
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Just two months after the Goldstein decision, the Greenwich-based
and, ironically named, 166 Amaranth Advisors collapsed under the weight
of its own heavily leveraged and highly speculative natural gas futures
positions. 167 The market barely blinked, and JPMorgan Chase & Co.
(Amaranth’s prime broker) and T. Boone Pickens were among those
who quickly swooped in to scoop up discounted chunks of Amaranth’s
decimated natural gas futures portfolio. Incidentally, just a few days
later, Mr. Pickens’s son was the subject of a Wall Street Journal article
reporting his alleged involvement in a “pump and dump” stock scheme
that employed “fax blasts” to induce investors to purchase touted
securities. 168 Meanwhile, Representative Frank, who retreated from his
165. Id.
Mr. Tanico also noted during a March 20, 2007 “Mergers and
Acquisitions” guest lecture at Fordham University School of Law:
I think at the higher end if the minimum requirements are a million dollars, and in the
larger fund that we have is five million dollars in investable assets without your home,
you’re a big boy, and you know what, if you lose your money [ ] you shouldn’t be
looking to the government to help you.
I think there should be a higher standard to that [for pension funds], and our being
registered makes us more comfortable for pension funds, so I think there’s an element
that I can kind of buy into.
166. am·a·ranth / Pronunciation [am-uh-ranth] – noun; 1. an imaginary, undying

flower. http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/amaranth (last visited, Dec. 5, 2006).
167. Gretchen Morgenson and Jenny Anderson, A Hedge Fund’s Loss Rattles
Nerves, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/19/
business/19hedge.html (last visited Dec 5, 2006).
168. Geoffrey Smith and Matthew Leising, Citadel, Funds Bet $3 Billion After
Amaranth Falls (Update2), BLOOMBERG, Oct. 16, 2006, available at
http://www.canadianhedgewatch.com/content/news/general/?id=1022 (last visited Dec.
6, 2006); see Kara Scannell, Stock-Scam Case: a Pickens, a Fax, Bad Luck, Oct. 30,
2006, WALL ST. J.
[T. Boone Pickens’s] son Michael O’Brien Pickens has taken a different path to try to
emulate that success, federal authorities alleged yesterday. The younger Mr. Pickens,
who is 51 years old, and another man were arrested and charged with securities fraud
for allegedly manipulating thinly traded stocks through a ‘pump and dump’ scheme
orchestrated via blast faxes—including some sent to the federal agencies that nabbed
them.

Id. (emphasis added); see Dallas billionaire’s son admits to securities fraud, DALLAS
BUS. J., Oct. 31, 2006, available at http://dallas.bizjournals.com/dallas/stories/
2006/10/30/daily14.html (last visited Dec. 30, 2006); SEC Charges Stock Promoters in
Phony Fax Scam, SEC Litigation Release No. 19305, July 18, 2005, SEC v. Joshua
Yafa, Michael O. Pickens et al., Civil Action No. 05 CV 6480 (SDNY LAK), available
at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr19305.htm (last visited Dec. 30, 2006);
FBI Press Release, Hot Stock Tip, Anyone? The Case of the Phony Faxes, Nov. 20,

2007

PRUNING THE HEDGE: WHO IS A “CLIENT”
AND WHOM DOES AN ADVISER ADVISE?

963

rather aggressive pro-regulatory stance subsequent to the November
2006 election, called for House Committee hearings on hedge funds, and
stated that he was “without any predisposition of saying more regulation
is needed.” 169
Charles Grassely, an Iowa Republican, has not been nearly as
ambivalent as some of his congressional peers with regard to his hedge
fund policy-making approach. The former Chairman, and now ranking
minority Senate Finance Committee member, unsuccessfully sought to
attach a hedge fund amendment to a recent Homeland Security bill,
because, as Mr. Grassley contended, various terrorist groups may have
undetected hedge fund links and possibly launder money through
securities trading activities of the secretive pooled investments.170
Senator Grassley also asserted while introducing a new bill that all
hedge funds managing more than $50 million in assets and serving more
than 15 investors should be compelled to register with the Commission
as Investment Advisers, a policy proposition generally consistent with
the now “arbitrary” rule that was vacated by the Goldstein court. 171
It certainly remains debatable whether the vacated Rule could have
possibly prevented (or even helped to predict) Brian Hunter, a 32 yearold trader formerly employed by Amaranth, from adopting a “bet the
farm” trading strategy in volatile natural gas futures during the summer
2006, available at http://www.fbi.gov/page2/nov06/stock_scam112006.htm (last visited
Dec. 30, 2006).
169. Frank Wants Hearings on Hedge Fund Industry, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 5, 2006,
http://www.boston.com/business/globe/articles/2006/12/05/airline_to_delay_taking_del
ivery_of_32_small_jets/ (last visited Dec. 5, 2006).
170. Marilyn Geewax, Powerful hedge funds present a dilemma for Congress,
regulators, SALT LAKE TRIBUNE, Mar. 17, 2007, available at http://www.sltrib.com/
business/ci_5461412 (last visited Mar. 18, 2007) (“The secretive way that hedge funds
operate might not be an issue for the super-rich who first invested in hedge funds, but
today the average Joe has a stake,” [Sen.] Grassley said in a statement. “Right now, a
hedge fund isn’t required to report even basic information about who runs the fund.”).
171. Id. Iowa Senator Charles Grassley’s “rebuffed” amendment would also have
required hedge funds to make their records available for routine regulatory inspections,
much like the “arbitrary” rule at issue (and vacated) in Goldstein. Sen. Grassley
introduced a terse, two page bill aiming to amend Section 203(b)(3) of the Investment
Advisors Act of 1940 titled, “The Hedge Fund Registration Act of 2007” which
effectively seeks to replace the term “client” with “investor” in order reverse the effect
of the U.S. Court of Appeals ruling in Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006),
and expressly authorize the SEC to compel hedge fund advisor registration. Copy of
Grassley bill available at http://grassley.senate.gov/releases/2007/05152007.pdf (last
visited May 21, 2007).
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of 2006. 172 Not surprisingly, many hedge fund managers seem to
agree. 173 Similarly, exchange-listed and registered issuers such as
Adelphia, Enron, Refco, and WorldCom all collapsed after defrauding
thousands of investors of millions of dollars, 174 all while filing periodic
reports, and under the regulatory auspices of major exchanges and the
SEC. 175
The split-Commission’s regulatory aim embodied laudable goals
and intentions, but was largely undermined by the parsing of its prior
use of a single word. A unanimous three-judge circuit court opinion
vacated the Rule; 176 most notably, it was apparently because of the
SEC’s inconsistent interpretation 177 of the term “client” for the purposes

172. Ann Davis, How Giant Bets on Natural Gas Sank Brash Hedge-Fund Trader Up in Summer, Brian Hunter Lost $5 Billion in a Week As Market Turned on Him,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 2006, at A1, available at http://online.wsj.com/article_print/
SB115861715980366723.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2007). Incidentally, Mr. Hunter,
Amaranth’s former natural gas futures trader, began actively seeking investors in late
March of 2007 for a new Calgary-based commodities hedge fund named “Solengo
Capital.” See Alistair Barr, Amaranth investors suggest dropping legal claims,
MARKETWATCH.COM, Mar. 23, 2007, available at http://www.marketwatch.com/
news/story/some-amaranth-investors-suggest-dropping/story.aspx?guid=%7B3E5061B
B-EB8A-4184-A456-8E59C5A5249B%7D (last visited Mar. 25, 2007). See also
Amaranth Advisors L.L.C., Comment Letter to SEC Re: File No. S7-30-04—
Registration under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, Sept. 15, 2004
(“Contrary to media stereotypes of hedge fund managers, Amaranth does not operate in
the shadows’ outside of regulatory scrutiny.”).
173. Melanie Waddell, Will the SEC Appeal? Dealing with hedge fund registration’s
INVESTMENT ADVISOR, Aug. 2006, available at
legal challenge,
http://www.investmentadvisor.com/article.php?topic=Alternative+Investments&article
=6648 (last visited Dec. 5, 2006). Some hedge fund managers are skeptical that a
registration requirement will prevent securities fraud:
Like other hedge fund advisors, Hedges says he’s “unconvinced that registration is
going to prevent fraud” in the $1.1 trillion hedge fund industry. “A lot of time,
money, investigation, and energy has been spent under the auspices of registration
being used to prevent fraud, and I don’t think that’s a sufficient deterrent,” he says. “I
think the SEC is already heavily burdened as an agency in terms of enforcement.”

Id.
174.
175.
176.
177.

See Goldstein Complaint, supra note 15, at ¶ 36.
Id.
See Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
See Speech, supra note 35. Commissioner Atkins has noted that the Rule’s
flaws invited scrutiny:
It is no wonder that the rule, with its ad hoc and internally inconsistent definition of
‘client,’ attracted a legal challenge. The majority, in adopting the registration
mandate, abandoned the common-sense notion that the client is the person for whom
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of the Rule, which in the court’s view, fell beyond “the bounds of
reasonableness.” 178 The Goldstein court vacated what was deemed to be
an “arbitrary” Rule and, while the SEC still possesses the data produced
from the now defunct registration regime, it was stripped of its ability to
perform hedge fund books and records inspections—perhaps the most
potent of the Rule’s investigative measures. Nonetheless, the glimmer
of a post-Goldstein regulatory dawn is on the horizon for those who
favor heightened regulatory oversight, or at least desire some semblance
of hedge fund transparency.
The sharp focus by the media, market commentators, legislators,
investors, and regulators on issues related to hedge funds in the
Goldstein aftermath might eventually lead to a shift in U.S. hedge fund
regulation (and possibly within certain foreign jurisdictions). Such
reform will apparently not come without staunch resistance. Recent
remarks from a presidential panel chaired by U.S. Treasury Secretary
Henry Paulson, asserted “the current system of hedge-fund regulation is
‘working well’ and market discipline remains the best way to protect
investors and guard against risks to the financial system.” 179 Former
the advice is tailored. The final rule redefined ‘client’ solely for advisors to hedge
funds and then only to determine their eligibility to rely on the fifteen client
exemption from registration. The new definition demands that advisors look through
their hedge funds and count investors as clients.
Regardless of how the Court decides the case, the challenge has already served to
remind us of the danger of undergoing regulatory contortions to achieve a
questionable objective.

Id.
178. See Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 881 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting Aid Ass’n
for Lutherans v. U.S. Postal Serv., 321 F.3d 1166, 74, 77-78 (D.C.Cir.2003)).
An agency construction of a statute cannot survive judicial review if a contested
regulation reflects an action that exceeds the agency’s authority. It does not matter
whether the unlawful action arises because the disputed regulation defies the plain
language of a statute or because the agency’s construction is utterly unreasonable and
thus impermissible.

Id.; cf. FCC v. Nat’l Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 808 n.29 (1978)
(citing SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 201-02 (1947)).
179. Judith Burns, Rep. Frank: No Decision Yet On Hedge Fund Regulation, DOW
JONES NEWSWIRES, Mar. 13, 2007, available at http://www.nasdaq.com/aspxcontent/
NewsStory.aspx?cpath=20070313%5CACQDJON200703131503DOWJONESDJONLI
NE000587.htm& (last visited Mar. 26, 2007). Opposition to a renewed hedge fund
registration framework was pronounced during recent congressional committee
testimony:
Industry officials and academics who testified before the House panel mostly opposed
requiring hedge fund managers to register with the Securities and Exchange
Commission, subjecting them to routine SEC inspections and annual audits. An SEC
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U.S Treasury Secretary John Snow, now the chairman of hedge fund
adviser Cerebus Capital Management, which recently acquired the
scandal-plagued Austrian bank BAWAG, has also urged for “lighter”
regulation and contended that the “real policing of these pools of capital
are the investors,” and that any additional regulatory efforts would
create “a real risk of moral hazard that implies, ‘Don’t worry. Now the
government is watching over you and there aren’t any problems.’” 180
The proposed “hands off” approach to today’s hedge funds might
produce similar results as a similar laissez faire philosophy did for
securities traders during the “roaring twenties,” such as notorious market
manipulator Jesse Livermore, who considered average investors to be
easy prey for poaching in a free-wheeling “survival of the fittest” stock
market. 181 Corruption and market manipulation may be the end result

rule to require mandatory registration of hedge fund managers was rejected last year
by a federal appeals court and several of those testifying to the House panel Tuesday
[March 13, 2007] said it isn’t needed and would give investors a false sense of
security. About half of hedge fund managers now choose to register voluntarily with
the SEC.

Id.; see David Scheer & Jenny Strasburg, U.S. Says Hedge Fund Regulation Is
‘Working Well’ (Update4), Feb. 22, 2007 BLOOMBERG.COM, available at
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aPwrzZyVCVx8
(last
visited April 24, 2007) Secretary Paulson noted his philosophy about market
regulation does not include guarding against hedge funds from “having problems”:
The panel, led by Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson and including his counterparts at
the U.S. Federal Reserve, the Securities and Exchange Commission and the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission, said in guidelines released today that the
responsibility of maintaining discipline falls on hedge-fund managers, investors,
creditors, trading partners and market regulators.
“Those who would believe that the role of regulators is to guard against any losses or
somehow prevent losses or to prevent a hedge fund from having problems, they have
a different philosophy about regulation than I do,” Paulson said in an interview.
The report by the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets, which Paulson
called the ‘unified perspective’ of U.S. regulators, makes no recommendations for
new government regulation.

Id.
180. Kevin Carmichael, Funds: In new role, Snow urges ‘lighter’ regulatory touch,
INT’L HERALD TRIBUNE, Nov. 21, 2006, available at http://www.iht.com/bin/print.php?
id=3349226 (last visited Mar. 26, 2007). See also Haig Simonian, Sale does not close
Bawag scandal, FINANCIAL TIMES, Dec. 15, 2006, available at http://search.ft.com/
ftArticle?queryText=BAWAG&y=0&aje=true&x=0&id=061215007121 (last visited
April 6, 2007).
181. See, e.g., Richard Smitten, JESSE LIVERMORE: WORLD’S GREATEST STOCK
TRADER, Wiley & Sons (2001); see Edwin Lefèvre, REMINISCENCES OF A STOCK
OPERATOR, George H. Doran & Co. (1923), republished by Wiley & Sons (1994).
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from a “less is more” regulatory approach, just as it did with “junk
bonds” in the Eighties, and corporate accounting scandals in the
Nineties. For example, New York and Washington prosecutors charged
thirteen suspects with insider trading offenses in a scheme that
implicated major brokerage firm employees as “central figures in an
insider-trading ring [that] illustrate[s] why regulators and lawmakers are
suspicious of Wall Street’s relationship with hedge funds.” 182 Those
recent arrests seem to suggest that perhaps market regulators have
placed newfound focus on prime brokers that facilitate hedge fund
trading activities after the Goldstein holding hindered the SEC’s ability
to investigate hedge funds directly.
Certainly not everyone is enamored with the notion of unrestrained
free-market forces as the “answer” to viral-like growth of hedge funds in
the domestic capital markets, and the massive influence they now wield.
Connecticut Attorney General Richard Blumenthal characterized the
presidential panel’s laissez faire proposal as little more than “vague
recommendations lack[ing] substance and specifics, making them

182. David Scheer, Insider-Trading Ring Bust May Fuel Hedge-Fund Concern
(Update3), BLOOMBERG.COM, Mar. 2, 2007, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/
apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aTDBCdaTQ774 (last visited Mar. 18, 2007). Insider
trading violations continue to be a priority of securities regulators, and some pundits
consider those violations to justify hedge fund registration:
“Incidents like this strengthen the hands of those who are urging greater scrutiny of
hedge-fund activities and their sources of information,” said David Becker, a former
SEC general counsel now in private practice at Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton
LLP in Washington
Legislators such as Senator Arlen Specter, the Pennsylvania Republican, want market
watchdogs to take action amid mounting evidence of rampant insider trading. At least
two studies show that stocks and derivatives regularly rise ahead of takeovers, and in
the past week trading of options to buy shares of TXU Corp. and Hyperion Solutions
Corp. surged in advance of announcements that they agreed to be acquired.
Hedge funds are private pools of capital that allow managers to participate
substantially in gains on the money invested. That pay structure creates an incentive
for employees to trade in non- public information. Hedge-fund managers also are
under pressure to boost returns that since 2000 have averaged half the industry’s gains
in the 1990s.
The temptation to cheat extends to the securities firms, which collect $10 billion a
year in fees for providing prime-brokerage services to hedge funds. “The larger the
pot of gold the more likely that you’ll entice someone into stealing,” said William
Portanova, a criminal-defense attorney and former federal prosecutor based in
Sacramento. “Good people convince themselves over a cocktail that it’s a victimless
crime and that they’re merely collecting a few crumbs from the feast that no one will
ever miss.”

Id.
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unenforceable, [and which] amount to a buyer-beware strategy that has
proven ineffective.” 183 Various members of Congress also appear less
than receptive to any sort of free market solution, among those is Texas
Democrat Al Green, who characterized the current state of hedge funds
as “the commingling of sophisticated and unsophisticated capital.” 184 At
least one prominent hedge fund manager, Kenneth Brody, co-founder of
Taconic Capital Advisors (which did not hesitate to register with the
SEC while the Rule was in effect), has become an advocate of sorts for
increased regulation due to the risk exposure pension funds presently
face with billions currently invested in hedge funds, and has urged for a
more flexible principles-based outcome, rather than rule-driven
regulations. 185 Lawmakers apparently remain uncertain about how to
even define the clandestine, unregulated pools of funds with any degree
of precision, which is perhaps the first step on the path towards

183.
184.

See Scheer & Strasburg, supra note 179.
See Jenny Anderson, House Panel Ponders the Growth and Risk of Hedge
Funds, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/
03/14/business/14hedge.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2007); see also Wall Street Pros Say
Hedge Funds Don’t Need New Regulations, CNBC.COM, Mar. 13, 2007, available at
http://www.cnbc.com/id/17595287 (last visited Mar. 18, 2007). The article points out
that:
[M]embers of the committee, chaired by Rep. Barney Frank, D-Mass., expressed
concern that average investors could be hurt without further oversight.
We are now concerned about the inadvertent consequence of a systemic-like event
which causes pensioners who have no idea their managers invested in a derivatives
currency arbitrage to lose money as a result of a Russian currency crisis,’ said Rep.
Richard Baker, (R) Louisiana.

Id.
185. See Anderson, supra note 184; see also David M. Katz, Lawmakers: HedgeFund Risk Hits Pensions, CFO.COM, Mar. 13, 2007, available at
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/8844660 (last visited Mar. 26, 2007) (Mr. Brody is also
chairman of the investment committee of the University of Maryland). Hedge fund
manager Kenneth Brody has become an advocate for a registration regime, and suggests
that such a framework would have a prophylactic effect:
[Kenneth] Brody’s answer was, like [Iowa Republican Senator Charles] Grassley’s, to
require mandatory registration of hedge-fund advisers by the SEC. What registration
provides, the hedge-fund manager said, “is self-discipline and self-policing, because
[registration] comes with the threat of an SEC investigation.”
Like many other hedge funds, however, Taconic Capital Advisors registers voluntarily
with the SEC. Brody pointed out that a number of the requirements of registration—
including the designation of a chief compliance officer; the presence of written
policies and procedures; a code of ethics; and retention of books and records—
“promote investor protection.”

Id.
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meaningful regulatory reform. 186
It seems that any pragmatic prediction would likely find some sort
of negotiated outcome to the hedge fund regulatory question to be
probable, especially when considering the sheer power that trillions of
dollars in capital can wield when matched against Capitol Hill
policymakers. As such, some sort of blended result appears likely where
higher tier hedge funds might voluntarily file disclosures with something
resembling a quasi-regulatory body, such as a voluntary membership
SRO-managed association. The quid-pro-quo for such disclosures
might be a sort of “best practices” benchmark, or “seal of approval.” 187
The SEC, NYSE, NASD, CTFC, and other similar enforcement bodies,
could then focus regulatory resources on the prime brokerages that call
these funds clients, such as the early 2007 “trading sweep” conducted by
the SEC of at least ten Wall Street firms during an investigation of
suspected trading improprieties from September 2006. 188 According to
186.
187.

See Geewax, supra note 170.
The National Football League Player’s Association (“NFLPA”) implemented a
“seal of approval” program for hedge fund advisers seeking union approval to manage
the investments of current and former NFL players. Nonetheless, at least one unionapproved hedge fund manager allegedly “stole over $100 million in investors money.”
See Jailed fund manager fined $20m for fraud, Feb. 13, 2007, FIN. TIMES, available at
http://news.moneycentral.msn.com/provider/providerarticle.aspx?Feed=FT&Date=2007
0213&ID=6473196 (last visited Mar. 26, 2007); see also Complaint, Atwater v.
NFLPA, Civ. Case No. 106-cv-01510-JEC (N. Dist. Ga. June 23, 2006); Feb. 12, 2007
SEC Litigation Release No. 19999, re: SEC v. Kirk S. Wright; Int’l Mgmt. Assocs.,
LLC et al., available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2007/lr19999.htm (last
visited March 18, 2007); Bishop: NFL, union ‘failed’ players hurt in scam, available at
http://www.nfl.com/news/story/9534836 (last visited Oct. 18, 2006); see also Fraud
lawsuit against NFL, union to proceed, NFL.com, Mar. 30, 2007, available at
http://www.nfl.com/news/story/10097842 (last visited April 1, 2007) (stating that U.S.
District Judge Julie E. Carnes (Georgia) denied defendants’ motion to dismiss on March
29, 2007 and noting that the league and players’ union owe duties to the players under
state law and nothing in the record suggested the NFL-NFLPA collective bargaining
agreement pre-empts that duty owed). Perhaps this decision will later extend to other
employer-employee contexts, such as where pension funds are imprudently placed with
rogue hedge fund managers resulting in investment losses or fraud and might give rise
to potential claims by pension fund beneficiaries.
188. See Scheer, supra note 182. The SEC conducted a “trading sweep” in early
2007 of at least ten Wall Street firms during an investigation of suspected tradingimproprieties allegedly occurring in September 2006:
Earlier this year, the SEC asked at least 10 Wall Street firms to turn over stock-trading
records for the last two weeks of September, seeking to determine whether they
leaked details about big stock trades to favored clients. The government said
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newly appointed Nasdaq vice-chairman, Michael G. Oxley, it would
require a ten-fold increase in the SEC budget to directly regulate hedge
funds. 189
V. CONCLUSION
A steady pace adopted by the SEC post-Goldstein may ultimately
produce innovative results as momentum continues to build in favor of
hedge fund reform. The NYSE and NASD already refer suspicious
buying and selling data to the SEC, and reportedly share hedge fund
market monitoring data with the SEC, according to NYSE Market
Surveillance Chief, Robert Marchman. 190 During a Fall 2006 lecture at
Fordham University School of Law, head of NASD enforcement, James
Shorris, speculated about the eventual possibility of an SRO-like hedge

yesterday that it broke one of the biggest insider-trading cases since the 1980s.
According to the SEC, which brought a civil suit against 14 defendants, the scheme
stretched over five years, included hundreds of tips and produced more than $15
million in illegal profits.

Id.
189. Maria Bartiromo, Michael Oxley’s Next Act, BUSINESS WEEK, April 9, 2007,
available at http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/07_15/b4029107.htm?
chan=top+news_top+news+index (last visited April 24, 2007).
Former U.S.
Representative Michael G. Oxley (Ohio), now non-executive vice-chairman of Nasdaq,
considers direct SEC regulation of hedge funds to be “unrealistic”:
I think private equity plays an enormous role in our economy that is somewhat
misunderstood. Whether they’re hedge funds or private equity concerns, they do a real
service. In many cases, private equity firms take a company private, fix it up, dress it
up, and put it back on the market for an IPO. We have enormous capital there that is
almost uniquely American. If we were to regulate, say, the hedge funds, you would
have to increase the budget of the SEC something like tenfold. It’s rather unrealistic.

Id.
190. Jesse Westbrook & David Scheer, SEC Plans Database to Stem Illegal HedgeFund Trading (Update3), BLOOMBERG, Dec. 5, 2006, available at
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=a41rbUuQZCZ4&refer=ho
me (last visited Jan. 2, 2007). U.S. regulatory bodies and SROs are increasingly sharing
market surveillance data:
The New York Stock Exchange and the NASD, which refer data about suspicious
buying and selling to the SEC, are coordinating efforts to share information about
hedge funds, Robert Marchman, head of market surveillance for the NYSE, said in an
interview.
The agencies plan to build out a database with information detailing relationships
between hedge funds and other ‘financial business-related entities’ in an effort to
uncover illegal trading, [Machman] said.

Id. (quoting an anonymous Senior U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Official).
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fund registration regime managed by the NASD. 191 During Senate
Committee testimony, SEC Enforcement Chief Linda Thomsen alluded
to a new SEC database surveillance system that will more closely
monitor hedge fund trading activities, but revealed scant details about
the new technologies currently in development. 192 One can only hope
191. Remarks by NASD Executive Vice President and head of enforcement, James
Shorris, Fordham University School of Law’s “Securities Enforcement” guest lecture,
Nov. 1, 2006 (notes from lecture on file with aurhor).
192. See Westbrook & Scheer, supra note 190. SEC officials have hinted that new
market surveillance technology is currently under development:
“The SEC presently does not have an electronic system to aggregate referrals based
on the identities of the specific traders involved,” SEC Enforcement Director Linda
Thomsen said before the Senate Judiciary Committee today. “We anticipate
implementing a new case tracking system by mid-2007.”
Illegal trading by hedge funds “remains a substantial concern” to the SEC as the $1.3
trillion industry’s influence over financial markets grows, Thomsen said. Hedge
funds, which are loosely regulated private pools of capital, manage about 5 percent of
U.S. assets and account for about 30 percent of U.S. equity trading volume.
Today’s [December 4, 2006] hearing is the third convened by Senator Arlen Specter,
the Judiciary Committee’s chairman, in six months to examine oversight of insider
trading. The Pennsylvania Republican circulated draft legislation aimed at halting
illegal buying and selling of stocks that would require hedge funds accepting money
from pension funds to submit to random inspections by the SEC.
His measure would also force hedge funds, which allow managers to participate
substantially in the gains of money invested, to set up ethics codes and compliance
programs and allow the Justice Department to give private citizens rewards for
helping in prosecutions of insider trading cases.
“Light regulation, secrecy, unregulated record keeping and limited compliance
programs of hedge funds increase the difficulty of detecting and proving insider
trading,” according to Specter’s legislation, which hasn’t been introduced.

Id. However, Kit Addleman, associate director of the Fort Worth, Texas regional SEC
enforcement office hinted in late March 2007 that new technologies were already being
employed as part of the ongoing “Operation Spamalot” investigation that has already
nabbed a number of suspects in alleged stock tout scams. See Brendan M. Case &
Michael Grabell, Exclusive: SEC investigating possible ‘pump-and-dump’ scam,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 25, 2007, available at http://www.dallasnews.com/
sharedcontent/dws/news/localnews/stories/032507dnmetsecinvestigate.40477d8.html
(last visited Mar. 27, 2007). The SEC has been tight-lipped about details regarding new
market surveillance technology, but published reports suggest that regulators are
already using new technology to detect securities fraud schemes:
The SEC won’t discuss particulars of its investigation, but such classic ‘pump-anddump’ scams are a high priority for the agency because e-mail spam and instant online
stock trading make small investors more vulnerable than ever.
“With the Internet technology, there is so much more ability to get to the retail
investors through their computers,” said Kit Addleman, associate director of
enforcement for the SEC’s regional office in Fort Worth.

Id.
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that appropriate and meaningful market reform will take effect prior to
any catastrophic market break.
Considering that the NASD maintained the SEC’s IARD
Investment Adviser Registration Database system, 193 as well as its own
internal “BrokerCheck” database 194 covering every registered
representative and broker-dealer member conducting securities business
in the U.S., it certainly seems that such an advent is well within the
realm of possibilities. An NASD hedge fund adviser registration regime
is also an entirely logical regulatory evolution in light of SEC Chairman
Cox’s strong support 195 for the combined NASD and NYSE
enforcement functions 196 (both of which have historically provided
193. The NASD is no stranger to enforcement issues involving hedge funds, and
activities such as market timing. See, e.g., NASD PRESS RELEASE, NASD Orders
Diversified Investors Securities to Pay Over $2.2 Million for Facilitating Market
Timing - Firm Also Fined for Supervisory Breaches, Email Failures, Feb. 14, 2006,
available
at
http://www.nasd.com/PressRoom/NewsReleases/2006NewsReleases/
NASDW_015974 (last visited Dec. 5, 2006); see Halah Touryalai, Another One Bites
the Dust: Broker Fined Record Amount for Market-Timing Scheme,
REGISTEREDREP.COM,
http://registeredrep.com/news/record-markettime-fine/
(last
visited Dec. 5, 2006); see Hedge fund manager gets record $2.25 million NASD fine,
REUTERS, Oct. 25, 2006, available at http://msnbc.msn.com/id/15413254/ (last visited
Oct. 30, 2006).
194. NASD BrokerCheck, http://pdpi4.nasdr.com/pdpi/Req_Type_Frame.asp (last
visited Dec. 5, 2006).
195. Dan Caterinicchia, NYSE, NASD to Meld Regulatory Operations, FORBES, Nov.
28,
2006,
available
at
http://www.forbes.com/home/feeds/ap/2006/11/28/
ap3210306.html (last visited Dec. 5, 2006). SEC Chairman Cox has been among those
who strongly support the combined regulatory functions of the NYSE and NASD:
Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman Christopher Cox, who has been a
vocal advocate of a single markets regulator, touted the increased enforcement
efficiencies that should come from the new system.
“When it comes to America’s competitiveness, we are advantaged when our
regulatory function is more efficient,” said Cox, calling the proposed merger “a
milestone.”
But Cox cautioned that the global regulatory landscape continues to change and will
necessitate future revisions to keep the U.S. competitive.
“The world in which we live isn’t sitting still. This appropriate adaptation to changes
all around us is going to be under constant review as the world markets continue to
integrate and change,” he added.

Id.
196. S.J. Caplan, There’s a New Sheriff Coming to Town, THE MOTLEY FOOL, Nov.
29, 2006, available at http://www.fool.com/News/mft/2006/mft06112916.htm (last
visited Mar. 26, 2007). The combined NYSE-NASD enforcement divisions will have
regulatory oversight of all U.S. broker-dealers:
[T]he two organizations announced the signing of a letter of intent to consolidate their
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cooperative enforcement assistance to the SEC), 197 suggesting that
significant evolution, and perhaps newfound regulatory efficiencies,
might eventually result from the united SRO enforcement entities,
among which could include a public-private partnership that provides
some reliable and trustworthy measure of hedge fund transparency and
accountability.
House Financial Services Committee Chairman Barney Frank has
continued to modify his post-Goldstein hedge fund policy stance. While
he has not yet committed to any specific conclusions, he did publicly
contemplate during a March 2007 Committee hearing “whether to
restrict hedge funds from accepting pension fund clients or bar pension
funds from hedge fund investments.” 198 According to Chairman Frank,
a regulation requiring hedge funds to retain certain records “primarily
for the purposes of law enforcement,” is another option under House
Committee consideration. 199 Self-imposed hedge fund guidelines,
including a voluntary international “code of conduct,” to foster
transparency, and in lieu of enhanced regulation, is yet another option
gaining support in some surprising circles. 200

regulatory operations into a new unnamed self-regulatory organization (SRO).
Expected to begin operations in the second quarter of 2007, the new entity will serve
as the private sector regulator for all broker-dealers doing business with the public in
this country.

Id.
197. See Westbrook & Scheer, supra note 190 (The SEC announced plans to “have a
database in place by next year that will help it crack down on hedge-fund insider
trading.”). The combined NYSE-NASD regulatory divisions are also developing new
market surveillance technologies:
The New York Stock Exchange and the NASD, which refer data about suspicious
buying and selling to the SEC, are coordinating efforts to share information about
hedge funds, Robert Marchman, head of market surveillance for the NYSE, said in an
interview.
The agencies plan to build out a database with information detailing relationships
between hedge funds and other ‘financial business-related entities’ in an effort to
uncover illegal trading, he said.

Id.
198.
199.
200.

See Burns, supra note 179.
Id.
Jenny Strasburg & Michael McKee, Steinbrueck Says Hedge Funds Should
Police Themselves (Update4), Mar. 16, 2007, BLOOMBERG.COM, available at
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601100&sid=aHr7iq.3kmug&refer=ger
many (last visited March 18, 2007). In a surprising development, the German official
who referred to hedge funds as “locusts” now believes the sector should be selfregulating:
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Perhaps Phillip Goldstein was more prescient than he realized when
he likened the SEC to a turtle, 201 and the Commission, like Aesop’s
fabled tortoise, 202 may just prevail in the long race towards hedge fund
regulation, though its victory may take a form substantially different
from the vacated Rule. And perhaps it will prove to be a fitting legacy
for the “Bulldog,” who was recently bestowed with a “Braveheart
Award” by the New York Times for his challenge of the now “arbitrary”
Rule, and who has wasted little time in mounting his next challenge to
further squelch required hedge fund disclosures. 203 The “Bulldog”
German Finance Minister Peer Steinbrueck said hedge-fund managers ought to create
a voluntary international ‘code of conduct’ to ward off more government regulation
by the Group of Seven nations.
Steinbrueck, whose Social Democratic Party derided private-equity firms and hedge
funds as ‘locusts’ two years ago, favors a push toward voluntary transparency by the
private investment pools. Leaders of other G-7 members, including the U.S. and
U.K., said in recent months they prefer market-based solutions, such as better policing
by brokerages and pension-fund managers, to protect investors and insulate the
markets from fund collapses.
Steinbrueck said he has met regularly with hedge-fund managers from the U.S. and
abroad since he took office in 2005. He declined to name which fund managers
attended the meetings but said some expressed support for self-monitoring among
funds.
“There are some hedge funds that are not behaving properly,” he said, declining to
elaborate. “They must have the deep interest themselves to tackle these problems.”
A system of self-imposed guidelines would take several months to create, and
government leaders aren’t ready to describe what information needs to be disclosed or
to whom, Steinbrueck said.
“This is the very beginning of this discussion,” he said. Steinbrueck said that hedgefund managers should provide more transparency to financial firms that lend them
money, service their margin accounts and clear their trades. The prime brokerages are
insufficiently informed to have accurate ‘risk profiles’ of their hedge-fund clients, he
said.

Id. (emphasis added).
201. See Goldstein January 2004 SEC Letter, supra note 80.
202. OLIVIA & ROBERT TEMPLE, AESOP: THE COMPLETE FABLES (Penguin Classics
1998).
203. Jenny Anderson, The Private Lives of Hedge Funds, N.Y. TIMES, at C1, Dec.
29, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 22713061. The New York Times bestowed this
tongue-in-cheek award to Mr. Goldstein for his successful challenge of the Rule:
THE BRAVEHEART AWARD—Phillip Goldstein was an unknown hedge fund
manager at an unremarkable hedge fund, Bulldog Investors, until he sued the
Securities and Exchange Commission, contending that the agency did not have the
authority to regulate hedge funds, and won. As a result, the court vacated the
controversial registration requirement and left the S.E.C. with little authority over
hedge funds.
The S.E.C. is now contemplating a rule that will prohibit all but 1.3 percent of
Americans from investing in hedge funds. It also rewrote a fraud provision that at
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wrapped himself in the Fifth Amendment and articulated an incomplete,
albeit novel, trade secrets theory in a pending battle with the SEC that
challenges the enforceability of Section 13 portfolio disclosure
requirements, and is championing the First Amendment in matters
against the state of Massachusetts and its Secretary of the
Commonwealth, William Galvin (who Mr. Goldstein has attacked in the
press as a “bully” and a “pompous ass”), regarding the alleged public
solicitation of prospective hedge fund investors via the Internet in yet
another Goldstein hedge fund skirmish. 204
After all the Goldstein dust settles, it seems certain that the
“Bulldog” and his seemingly indomitable regulatory windmill-tilting
will be forever recognized for having sparked substantive discourse that
could eventually shape the future of the domestic capital markets in
which Americans invest, perhaps for generations to come. Eventual
policy reform may decide whether hedge funds will be permitted to
operate under a persistent cloak of secrecy, or whether the bedrock
securities principle of disclosure will apply to this enormous pool of
capital that affects the U.S. markets, economy, and citizens, for better or
for worse. The “Bulldog” will invariably be viewed by history as a
genuine market maverick and the incendiary catalyst for much of that
reformist debate, and will always be intertwined with the outcome, in
whatever form it eventually takes. And it all began with a single word.

least allows it to go after, well, fraud.

Id. See also Pekarek, supra note 78.
204. Pekarek, supra note 78.

